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TAX EXPERIMENTATION

Abstract
Random experiments could allow the government to test tax policies
before enactment into general law. Such experiments can be
revenue-neutral, with the tax authority ensuring ex post that average
tax revenues received from taxpayers in the treatment and control
groups are equal. Taxpayers might thus volunteer even for
experiments that would broaden the tax base, for example by
eliminating deductions. Continued participation by taxpayers in
such experiments would indicate that the proposed reforms are
efficient at least if externalities are disregarded. Non-revenueneutral experiments raise greater concerns about horizontal
inequity, but may be helpful in addressing questions about effects of
tax rates and in increasing participation.
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The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 20171 is an experiment on a grand scale. If,
as critics claim, the statute encourages expensive tax avoidance strategies that will
lead to even lower tax revenues than projected,2 the inefficiencies and budget
strains3 will be national in scope. The experiment has no control group. If the
Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). The bill was entitled the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” until
right before it passed, when the Senate parliamentarian ruled that the title violated reconciliation
rules. As a result, the final bill was entitled “An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles
II and V of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018.” Most commentators
continue to refer to the bill as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (or TCJA). See, e.g., Stephen K. Cooper,
Eyes Turn Toward 2018 Tasks as Tax Reform Becomes Law, 158 TAX NOTES 28 (Jan. 1, 2018)
(“The law, known informally as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97)…”); Amy Hamilton,
Connecticut Finds a SALT Workaround That Would Actually Work, TAX ANALYSTS, Feb. 26, 2018
(referring without qualification to the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act”).
2
David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: An Update on the Conference Committee Tax Bill
(Feb. 26, 2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3089423
(identifying numerous mechanisms that taxpayers may use to avoid taxes as a result of the tax
reform).
3
The official estimate of the Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation is
that the tax changes will cause an increase in deficits over 10 years of $1.8 trillion. See
1
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economy grows rapidly over the next few years, reform proponents will likely take
credit, while critics will insist that the economic growth was exogenous.4 Both sides
will make their case with anecdotal evidence rather than the results of randomized
experiments that economists generally prefer.5 Scholars have identified an
empirical deficit in tax scholarship,6 but because federal tax law exhibits little
exogenous variation,7 the deficit is difficult to correct.8
This Article describes an approach to tax reform that might have been and
that still might be: an experimental approach, in which proposed reforms are tested
initially on groups of willing taxpayers. In recent years, the legal literature has
focused attention on the design9 and justifiability10 of randomized government
policy, in areas including consumer protection,11 securities law,12 patent law,13 and
even regulation of food safety.14 Randomized experiments produce the best
attainable evidence of the effect of legal policies on behavior, but the only known

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATED DEFICITS AND DEBT UNDER THE CONFERENCE
AGREEMENT OF H.R. 1 (2018), available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53437.
4
Economists had different estimates of the efficiency consequences of the last large tax reform. See
Alan J. Auerbach & Joel Slemrod, The Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 35 J. ECON.
LIT. 589, 619-20 (1997).
5
See, e.g., Gary Burtless, The Case for Randomized Field Trials in Economic and Policy Research,
9 J. ECON. PERSP. 63 (1995).
6
See, e.g., Michael J. Bommarito II et al., An Empirical Survey of the Population of U.S. Tax Court
Written Decisions, 30 VA. TAX REV. 523, 526 (2011) (“Many authors have noted the absence of
empirical research in tax law,” an article a few years ago complained.”); Nancy Staudt, Empirical
Taxation, 13 Wash. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 1-2 (2003) (“[T]he literature gives legislators little guidance
for selecting one proposal from another in the wide array of sound policy options.”).
7
The exceptional rigorous analyses of changes in federal law prove the rule. Ed Fox, for example,
analyzes the effect of federal tax law on marriage by exploiting differences in state laws that led the
federal law to apply differently in different states at the same time. See Edward Fox, Do Taxes Affect
Marriage? Lessons from History (2017) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
8
The deficit may also exist in part because tax law professors prefer theory to empirics. See Staudt,
supra note 6, at 2 (“[F]ew attempt to test whether their hypotheses hold true in the real world.”). But
even in a conference on tax empiricism, none of the papers directly assessed the effects of federal
law. See id. at 5-8 (describing the contributions). With greater policy variation, especially random
variation, scholarship would likely follow.
9
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (2011).
10
See Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, “May the Odds Be Ever in Your Favor”: Lotteries in Law, 66
ALA. L. REV. 1035 (2015).
11
See Talia B. Gillis, Putting Disclosure to the Test: Toward Better Evidence-Based Policy, 28 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 31 (2015).
12
See Zachary J. Gubler, Making Experimental Rules Work, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 551 (2015).
13
See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65 (2015).
14
See Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism, 69 STAN. L. REV.
1 (2017).
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randomized experiments involve tax procedure15 and welfare,16 not substantive tax
law. Interest in the effects of tax law on taxpayer behavior pervades the literature,17
has been virtually no consideration of whether tax law might benefit from
systematic randomized experiments.18
Tax law, however, is a promising field in which the government might run
randomized experiments. The large number of taxpayers should make it possible to
find voluntary treatment groups that are small relative to the population, yet large
enough to generate statistical power.19 Each tax change would apply to a random
selection of qualified taxpayers agreeing to opt in to the experiment, thus producing
both a treatment group and a control group still subject to the status quo law.
Experiments might test multiple tax law changes, disentangling any resulting
interaction effects when individual taxpayers are in multiple treatment groups.20
Meanwhile, tax experiments could be much cheaper than many other forms of legal
experimentation, because the existing obligation to file tax forms 21 provides the
government much of the evidence that it might need to assess the effects of an
experiment.
A plausible explanation for the lack of attention to tax experimentation lies
in tax law’s core value of horizontal equity.22 This value makes especially salient
15

See, e.g., STATE OF CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, READYRETURN PILOT: TAX YEAR 2004
STUDY RESULTS (2006) (reporting results of an experiment on sending taxpayers pre-filled returns),
available at https://www.ftb.ca.gov/readyReturn/TY04RRFinalReport.pdf. Id. at 2. But the survey
reported no results on perhaps the most interesting question, whether control group taxpayers paid
more or less tax than treatment group taxpayers. Id. at 29-30 (comparing treatment group taxpayers
reported state and federal income, but ignoring control group taxpayers); cf. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr.,
Intuit’s Nine Lies Kill State E-Filing Programs and Keep ‘Free’ File Alive, TAX ANALYSTS SPECIAL
REPORT, Aug. 30, 2010, at 555, 559 (arguing that taxpayers using ReadyReturn paid no more taxes
than others, but without any comparisons between taxpayers and control group to support this
argument).
16
See DAVID KERSHAW & JERILYN FAIR, 1 THE NEW JERSEY INCOME-MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENT:
OPERATIONS, SURVEYS, AND ADMINISTRATION (1976).
17
See, e.g., William J. Congdon et al., Behavioral Economics and Tax Policy, 62 NAT’L TAX J. 375
(2009).
18
A rare exception is the following single sentence: “Conceivably, field experiments could be
designed where individuals are randomly assigned to different tax schedules in the spirit of the older
negative income tax experiments in the United States.” Emmanuel Saez et al., The Elasticity of
Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 1, 43
(2012) (referring to experiments mentioned infra note 24 and accompanying text).
19
See, e.g., Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis, 1 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 98,
98 (1992) (noting that statistical power depends on sample size).
20
See generally JIM JACCARD & ROBERT TURRISI, INTERACTION EFFECTS IN MULTIPLE REGRESSION
(2003) (describing techniques for identifying interactions between multiple variables of interests).
21
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6012 (specifying who must file U.S. federal tax returns).
22
Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, A New Measure of Horizontal Equity, 92 AM. ECON. REV.
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concerns that experiments necessarily produce unequal treatment of similarly
situated individuals. Randomly assigning some taxpayers to a tax law change
violates horizontal equity, because those taxpayers would then be treated
differently from similarly situated taxpayers not so assigned. This concern
diminishes if the treatment is a tax break. Randomized government experiments
offering benefits are widely considered ethical,23 and random experiments granting
low-income individuals have occurred.24 Experiments often offer the treatment
group something denied to the control group. In medical experiments, some patients
who hope for a new treatment instead receive placebo.25 If uncertainty about
relative efficacy suffices to justify medical experiments,26 then legal experiments
should be similarly defensible.
There are, however, problems with tax experiments limited to tax breaks.
First, experimentation becomes a one-way ratchet, always expected to lower tax
revenues. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act increases deficits,27 so future policymakers
may need to raise more revenue, not to select further tax breaks. Second, tax policy
questions susceptible to experimentation often involve trade-offs, for example
whether taxpayers might be better off with higher rates but more deductions. Third,
taxpayers opting in to tax experiments will generally be well-advised and wealthy,28
so experimentation on tax breaks will often be inherently regressive.
These concerns, however, reflect a fallacy. If treatment group taxpayers
benefit relative to the control group, then it might seem that all other taxpayers lose.
After all, if some pay less revenue to the government, then others bear a higher
1116, 1116 (2002) (“[T]here is virtual unanimity that horizontal equality—the extent to which
equals are treated equally—is a worthy goal of any tax system.”).
23
See, e.g., Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 968 (“[W]hen scarce resources are distributed,
randomization ensures that the distribution occurs without favor and in a way that limits rentseeking.”). For a detailed treatment of ethical issues in social experiments, see ETHICAL AND LEGAL
ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION (Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael Timpane eds., 1975).
24
See, e.g., KERSHAW & FAIR, supra note 16.
25
The use of a placebo was initiated by Austin Flint in 1862. See AUSTIN FLINT, A TREATISE ON
THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF MEDICINE 1019-20 (4th ed. 1873).
26
The literature on research ethics suggests that experiments are permissible where practitioners are
in “clinical equipoise” about the best course of treatment. A critique is that a doctor’s individualized
obligation is not to choose among treatments at random, but to choose a treatment thought to be best
given available information for each individual patient. See Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody,
Clinical Equipoise and the Incoherence of Research Ethics, 32 J. MED. & PHIL. 151, 156 (2007)
(arguing that clinical equipoise is an incoherent theory and that ethical obligations in research are
distinct from those in clinical settings).
27
See supra note 3.
28
The government has sought to address this concern by providing grants for Low Income Taxpayer
Clinics.
See
Internal
Revenue
Service,
Low
Income
Taxpayer
Clinics
https://www.irs.gov/advocate/low-income-taxpayer-clinics (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
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proportion of taxation’s overall burden. But taxpayers in the treatment group might
benefit while paying the same level of tax on average as taxpayers in the control
group. Many proposals for tax reform purport to correct inefficiencies in the tax
code. Changes that remove economic distortions could be combined with rate
changes in ways that would improve taxpayer welfare while maintaining
government revenue.
This observation leads to the following insight: tax experiments can be
revenue neutral by design.29 The treatment group in such an experiment on average
pays taxes as high as the control group. Revenue neutrality substantially addresses
the problems above. A revenue-neutral experiment is not a one-way ratchet;
instead, it allows questions of economic efficiency to be assessed independent of
normative questions about overall tax levels and about the distribution of the tax
burden across income and other groups.30 Revenue-neutral experiments necessarily
allow the government to assess the impact of trade-offs. Even if only relatively
wealthy taxpayers opt into these experiments, they would be guaranteed to pay as
much in taxes as they would absent experimentation. Participating taxpayers
anticipate benefiting from the trade-offs embodied by experiment, but not at the
direct expense of other taxpayers. Their experience, moreover, may help generate
tax reform of broader benefit.
What combination of tax changes might serve as the subject of a tax
experiment? Consider, as a simple (at the risk of being trivial) illustration, the recent
tax reform’s limitations on the deductibility of entertainment expenses.31 Under
prior law, taxpayers could deduct expenses such as tickets for a sporting event used
to entertain a client,32 but taxpayers can no longer do so. A longstanding argument
29

Commentators have often suggested that tax reform should be revenue neutral. See Jason S. Oh,
Will Tax Reform Be Stable?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1200 (2017) (“In the current fiscal
environment, it is widely accepted that any tax reform should not lose any revenue…. Revenueneutrality is particularly relevant in base-broadening reform ….”). But revenue neutrality has not
been discussed in connection with experimentation.
30
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act will result by 2027 in
a lower percentage of total tax revenues being paid by those with relatively high incomes and a
higher percentage of total tax revenues being paid by those with relatively low incomes. See JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R.
1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” 5 (Dec. 18, 2017), available at
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5054 (projecting, for example, that
taxpayers with income of $1,000,000 or over will contribute 18.9% of total taxes, instead of 19.1%
of total taxes under prior law).
31
I.R.C. § 274(a)(1) as amended by Pub. L. 115-97 § 13304(a)(1)(A) (“No deduction otherwise
allowable under this chapter shall be allowed for any item… With respect to an activity which is of
a type generally considered to constitute entertainment, amusement, or recreation”).
32
Entertainment expenses were deductible if they were “directly related” to or “associated with” the
taxpayer’s trade or business. I.R.C. § 274(a) (2012); Walliser v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 433 (1974)
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for restricting deductibility of such expenses is that taxpayers derive utility from
such expenditures.33 Because the recipient of entertainment benefits generally need
not include the benefits in income,34 deductibility immunizes such expenditures
from taxation.35
Limitations on the entertainment deduction might seem a poor candidate for
experimentation, because no one would volunteer for increased tax liability.
Whatever the act’s overall merits, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act demonstrates the
political palatability of bundling taxpayer-unfriendly changes with taxpayerfriendly changes. A limitation on deductibility was joined to a rate reduction. The
entertainment deduction limits recouped only a tiny fraction of the revenue loss
from other parts of the tax bill.36 But the lobbyists’ embrace or at least grudging
acceptance of this tax reform, as opposed to a reform that lowered rates less with
no change to entertainment expense deductibility, suggests that the deduction was
distortionary. It is hard to tell for sure.37 But the example conceptually demonstrates
that taxpayers should embrace revenue-neutral tax changes that remove
decisionmaking distortions.
How might an experiment on entertainment deductibility have worked?
Taxpayers could have volunteered to give up their entertainment deductions. The
(finding otherwise deductible entertainment expenses failed both “directly related” and “associated
with” tests).
33
President Kennedy expressed this argument clearly: “Even though in some instances
entertainment and related expenses have an association with the needs of business, they nevertheless
confer substantial tax-free personal benefits to the recipients.” Hearings on Tax Recommendations
of the President Contained in His Message Transmitted to Congress Before the House Comm. on
Ways & Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (Apr. 20, 1961).
34
See United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118 (1968) (holding that taxpayer had no gross income
from travel and apparent entertainment expenses provided by automobile manufacturer who wanted
taxpayer to open a dealership); see also I.R.C. § 132(a)(3) & (d) (excluding fringe benefits from
employee’s gross income when the expenditures would have been deductible by the employee if
paid by the employee him- or herself).
35
The issues raised by the entertainment deduction arise as well with other potentially deductible
expenses, such as expenses for meals, home offices, and education. For an early reform proposal
accounting for these connections, see Daniel I. Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living
Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 859 (1974).
36
The TCJA’s limitation on meal and entertainment expenses was estimated by the nonpartisan
Joint Committee on Taxation to raise $23.5 billion over the 10-year budget window. See Joint
Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1,
The "Tax Cuts And Jobs Act", Fiscal Years 2018-2027, at 4 (Dec. 18, 2017) (Rep. No. JCX-67-17),
available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053.
37
The combination of large corporation tax rate reductions with limitations on certain business
deductions might be attributed to a political motive to highlight large reductions, if those reductions
are greater in salience than the deduction limitations. [difficulty of inferring intent of multimember
body]

TAX EXPERIMENTATION

9

carrot to induce participation would be that these taxpayers would receive lower
rates, just low enough that government tax revenues would be identical. If the
government selected this rate, it might miscalculate or intentionally set the rate low,
disguising a tax cut as an experiment.38 But there is a simple antidote: The law
authorizing such experiments could provide that the total tax liability of treatment
group taxpayers will be multiplied by a factor sufficient to ensure that revenues
from these taxpayers will equal in the aggregate the revenues that they would have
paid, as extrapolated from payments by control group taxpayers. For example, if
the average treatment group taxpayer’s liability when measured after limiting
interest deductions would have been 1% more than the average control group
taxpayer’s liability, then each treatment group taxpayer might be given
approximately a 1% discount on the nominal reported tax liability, calculated
without granting the entertainment deduction.39
With so simple a formula for achieving revenue neutrality, the taxpayers
most likely to opt in will be those that in the absence of the experiment would claim
a relatively small entertainment deduction anyway. This would be unfortunate, as
the greatest tax distortion presumably involves taxpayers who take large
entertainment deductions. But a more sophisticated approach could calculate a
custom multiplier for each participant. A statistical model developed after the
experiment would feature ex ante attributes of the treatment and control group
taxpayers, including previous entertainment expenses, as independent variables.
The model would predict total tax liability reported by both control and treatment
group taxpayers during the experimental period. If the model predicted that a
taxpayer would have liability 3% higher if assigned to the control group, then the
taxpayer would receive approximately a 3% tax rate reduction on the nominal
reported tax liability if assigned to treatment. A treatment taxpayer’s entertainment
expenditures would not reduce tax liability, and the taxpayer therefore would have
incentives to reduce entertainment expenditures on the margin.
This approach can equally be used to experiment on the possibility of new
deductions. For example, currently tax law does not allow taxpayers to deduct
commuting expenses.40 Commuting expenses may be seen either as enabling
taxpayers to travel to work or as enabling taxpayers to live away from work, so the
normative case for deductibility is close.41 An experiment might test deductibility
38

Cf. Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Lipstick, Light Beer, and Back-Loaded Savings
Accounts, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1101, 1148 (2006) (criticizing purported tax reform proposals as
“amount[ing] to little more than a disguised tax cut for high-income individuals”).
39
More precisely, the tax payment multiplier would be (100 / 101) to ensure revenue neutrality, so
the discount is approximately 0.99%.
40
I.R.C. § 262; Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
41
See generally Tsilly Dagan, Commuting, 26 VA. TAX. REV. 185, 201-34 (2006) (analyzing policy
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for all or only in limited circumstances, such as for commuting to an employer
located far from affordable housing. Treatment group taxpayers would receive the
deduction offered but would pay higher tax rates to maintain revenue neutrality
relative to the control group. This could facilitate efficient behavioral changes, for
example leading a taxpayer to work for an employer further away.42 Or, the
experiment might fail, suggesting the efficiency of the status quo.
Revenue-neutral tax experiments cannot answer all normative questions
about tax law changes. First, these experiments assess efficiency only. A full
normative analysis should embrace distributional concerns as well, which have
received increased attention as inequality nationally has widened.43 Nonetheless,
the practice of revenue-neutral experimentation could promote attention to
distributional issues. Some critics of the recent tax law changes argue that these
changes amounted to a regressive tax cut disguised as tax reform.44 Experimentation
could generate relatively uncontroversial tax reform measures, reducing the need
for omnibus tax reform packages focused on efficiency. A tax package featuring
untested or rejected efficiency measures might face criticism. Experimentation
could thus foster a policy culture in which distributional issues are considered
directly and acknowledged as policy choices, rather than assumed to be inevitable
epiphenomena of other tax policies.45
Second, the experimental approach assumes that taxpayers internalize
benefits of tax law provisions, but tax provisions may be motivated by anticipated
third-party effects. For example, the mortgage interest tax deduction is purportedly
motivated by a desire to provide incentives for home ownership, which supposedly
generates positive externalities.46 Many scholars are skeptical of this justification,47
arguments); Ronald S. Ross, Should Deductible Commuting Be Contingent on Principal-Place-ofBusiness Criteria?, 83 J. TAX’N 88 (1995) (summarizing legal developments and arguments).
42
This argument is strongest if the taxpayer’s residence is effectively fixed. See William A. Klein,
Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses: Tax Policy and the Need for Nonsimplistic Analysis of
“Simple” Problems, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 871, 880 (1969).
43
See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2017) (documenting
increased equality within nations).
44
See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, You Cannot Be Too Cynical About the Republican Tax Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/opinion/republican-taxbill-trump-corker.html.
45
Robert Shiller has proposed that the government specify in advance the maximum level of
inequality. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 14964 (2003).
46
See, e.g., Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are
Homeowners Better Citizens?, 45 J. URB. ECON. 354 (1999) (finding evidence that homeownership
causes greater investment in social capital).
47
See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is Not
Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 191- 92 (2009); Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen
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but the experimental approach that we describe here does not provide a means for
measuring such externalities or their absence. It might, however, be possible to
design an experiment that can overcome this concern by experimenting at a level
other than that of a taxpayer. For example, a homeowner’s association might be
allowed to opt in on behalf of all owners of homes in the association. If we assume
that this level internalizes externalities, then the willingness of such associations to
participate would suggest that the benefits of the proposed treatment exceed the
costs.
Third, revenue-neutral experiments cannot easily assess the macroeconomic
consequences of changes in tax rates. Revenue neutrality would undo an isolated
tax rate change. Proponents justify important features of the recent tax reform, such
as the reduction in corporate tax rates48 and the allowance of reduced rates for
certain passthrough income,49 on the ground that they will improve the overall
economic climate, thus benefiting workers as well as owners of capital. 50 Nonrevenue-neutral tax experiments may thus be needed.51 For example, the
government might have selected random taxpayers to receive a 1% tax reduction in
passthrough income and assessed the effects of such a reduction. Such experiments
can provide information beyond the power of revenue-neutral tax experiments, at
the cost of more serious horizontal equity objections. Without the revenueneutrality constraint, the government can also grant inducements to participants in
tax experiments, such as a promise that treatment taxpayers will pay on average
less than control taxpayers. Such inducements could reduce concerns about adverse
selection and enable experiments with treatment groups covering many reforms.52
With non-revenue-neutral experiments, success must be based on defined
criteria, such as whether treatment businesses hire more employees. With opt-in
revenue-neutral experiments, success can be measured based on the willingness of
taxpayers to opt in, once early experimental periods produce information about the
likely trade-offs. Such experiments can do little harm. At worst, only a few
taxpayers, potentially unrepresentative, will participate, and the experiment will
Virtues of Homeownership, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 890 (2011).
48
I.R.C. 11(b), as amended by Pub. L. 115-97 § 13001(a) (cutting corporate tax rate from 35% to
21%).
49
I.R.C. § 199A, added by Pub.L. 115-97 § 11011(a).
50
See Martin A. Sullivan, Corporate Tax Incidence Made Simple, 157 Tax Notes 454 (Oct. 23,
2017) (providing overview of the evidence that cutting corporate tax rates will, to some extent,
benefit workers).
51
MARK P. KEIGHTLY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41596, THE MORTGAGE INTEREST AND PROPERTY
TAX DEDUCTIONS: ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS 8–11 (Mar. 18, 2014) (reviewing the literature on
whether the home mortgage interest deduction creates positive externalities to justify the tax
benefit), reprinted in 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 55-17.
52
See infra Part III.A.
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never scale up. If the experiment does scale, taxpayers would come to learn what
tax rate discount or increase they might expect in exchange for the new tax
treatment. Unless virtually all taxpayers wish to be part of an experiment, the
government should be cautious in making an experiment permanent, because
opting-in taxpayers are self-selected. The government therefore might transition
gradually, by making an opt-in experiment opt-out and then ultimately mandatory.53
Alternatively, the government might allow all taxpayers to opt into the treatment
group, without requiring it of any taxpayers.
Part I will describe revenue-neutral tax experiments in more detail,
illustrating how they can be used to assess a wide range of tax policies. Part II will
identify challenges for revenue-neutral experimentation, including scaling up
experiments, addressing concerns about horizontal and vertical equity, countering
the danger of taxpayer manipulation, and testing tax expenditures and other policies
with goals beyond efficiency. Finally, Part III will consider non-revenue-neutral
experiments. It will explain how such experiments can induce greater participation
on a wider range of issues and can study the effect of changing marginal tax rates.
It also describes the possibility of self-executing tax experiments, in which the law
automatically will change in a direction indicated by the experimental results, and
experiments in which individual taxpayers are not the unit of experimentation.
I.

REVENUE-NEUTRAL TAX EXPERIMENTS

This Part discusses how the government might use revenue-neutral tax
experiments to assess the efficiency of various features of the tax code. The
approaches described here might be used by the U.S. federal government, by state
or local governments, or by foreign governments. Thus, while we will use
provisions from the Internal Revenue Code and recent tax reform statutes and
proposals as examples, our analysis is not dependent on the structure of the U.S.
income tax system. Part I.A elaborates the entertainment deduction experiment
discussed in the introduction, and Part I.B describes other potential tax experiments.
A. A Hypothetical Experiment
The goal of revenue-neutral tax experimentation is to identify potential sets
of changes to tax law that in combination would provide the government the same
amount of revenue but that would reduce distortion of economic activity. This
section elaborates how an experiment might have tested the ultimately adopted
reform of removing the entertainment expenses deduction.
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See infra Part II.A.
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1. The Potential Benefit to Taxpayers
Why might a taxpayer be interested in the combination of tax rate reduction
and loss of the deduction, assuming the taxpayer anticipates paying around the same
amount as before? Consider a taxpayer with gross income of $110,000, a tax rate
of 25%,54 and $10,000 in certain entertainment expenses deductible under what we
will assume is current law. Further, suppose that this taxpayer receives $8,000 in
subjective value from these expenses. That is, the taxpayer would be equally happy
if the taxpayer could reallocate the $10,000 entertainment expenses to $2,000 in
taxes and $8,000 in cash. In the table below, this is listed as Scenario 1. Of course,
not all taxpayers would value $83,000 in take-home pay as much as $75,000 plus
$10,000 in entertainment expenses, but some might. Our immediate burden is not
to show that a revenue-neutral change would be good for all taxpayers, just that it
might be good for some.

Table 1. Hypothetical effects of an experiment
Gross
income

Entertain
Taxable
Tax rate Taxes
Take
-ment
income
home
Expenses
income
Status quo
$110K
$10K
$100K
25%
$25K
$75K
Scenario 1
$110K
$0
$110K
24.5%
$27K
$83K
Scenario 2
$108K
$2K
$106K
23.5%
$25K
$81K
This scenario illustrates that a tax law change can make the government
better off (receiving $2,000 more in revenue) while making a taxpayer no worse
off. Though such tax changes are a plausible policy goal, a taxpayer would have no
incentive to take the trouble to opt into such an experiment. The fact that this tax
law change produces a surplus of $2,000, however, suggests that it is possible to
imagine a tax law change that could make this hypothetical taxpayer better off and
the government no worse off. Consider, for example, Scenario 2. Here, we assume
that the taxpayer spends $2,000 on entertainment and this reduction in spending
leaves the taxpayer with only $108,000 in gross income. With a 23.5% tax rate, the
taxpayer pays $25,000 in taxes, leaving the taxpayer with $81,000 in take home
income. Some taxpayers might prefer this to the status quo. If not, then the
experiment would simply fail.

54

These numbers are chosen to make the math easy, not to reflect the intricacies of the tax code. A
more realistic example would take into factors such as the standard deduction. See I.R.C. § 63(c)
(allowing taxpayers to deduct a fixed amount of money in lieu of itemizing deductions).
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2. Adjustments to Ensure Revenue Neutrality
The sizes of the treatment and control groups could be equal, but that is not
necessary. The advantage of using an equal number of taxpayers in each group is
that this provides the greatest statistical power.55 If either group is sufficiently small,
then any differences between the two groups are more likely to be attributable to
noise. On the other hand, placing most opting-in taxpayers in the treatment group
maximizes the number who may receive their preferred tax treatment. For ease of
exposition, however, we will assume that the groups are the same size.
The simplest technique for achieving revenue neutrality would be to
calculate the quotient of the total taxes paid by the control group divided by the
total taxes calculated by the treatment group, prior to applying a multiplier. Each
taxpayer in the treatment group would then pay taxes equal to the amount the
taxpayer reported, multiplied by this quotient. Suppose, for example, that the
control group taxpayers paid a total of $1 billion in taxes, and the treatment group
taxpayers reported a total of $1.04 billion in taxes. (A higher tax bill would be
expected for this experiment, since the experiment is removing what we assume
was a deduction available under current law.) Then, a treatment group taxpayer
who had $100,000 in gross income would have reported $25,000 in taxes,
regardless of the amount of entertainment expenses that the taxpayer incurred. Tax
liability, however, would be only $25,000 * (1 / 1.04), or around $24,000.
This approach to calculating the tax multiple enhances the likelihood that
treatment group taxpayers will respond in the same way as they would if there were
a broader change in tax law affecting all taxpayers. A taxpayer in the control group
has experienced no legal change at all and thus should presumably behave in the
same way as the taxpayer would have if the experiment had never occurred.56 We
are assuming, of course, that the experiment is large enough that each member of
the treatment group will have only a negligible effect on the tax ratio. If we
imagined the opposite—an experiment with two taxpayers, one in the treatment
group and one in the control group—then the treatment taxpayer would expect its
own tax liability to be equal to that of the control group taxpayer, and the treatment
taxpayer would behave as if a lump sum tax would be imposed.57 The law of large
numbers is essential not only for statistical validity, but also because revenue
55

For a proof, see https://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/265622/sample-size-proportion-percontrol-vs-experiment-group (last visited March 1, 2018).
56
Below, we will consider the caveat that the treatment group’s tax change might have some indirect
effect on the control group. See infra Part I.A.4.
57
This is not entirely a bad result. Economists generally assume that lump sum taxes are the least
distortionary. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation, 17 J. PUB. ECON.
213, 217 (1982).
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neutrality means that the tax liability of each treatment group participant depends
on all other participants’ tax returns.58
Calculating a single ratio for all taxpayers is not the best approach.
Taxpayers with low levels of entertainment deductions would be especially likely
to opt in. The ratio of taxes paid by taxpayers in the control and treatment groups
would then be close to 1. Those with large entertainment deductions would thus opt
out. The tax authority must calculate a different ratio for each treatment taxpayer,
based on how placement in the control or treatment group affected taxpayers with
similar characteristics. A simple version along these lines would be to define
subgroups of taxpayers. A group, for example, might consist of all taxpayers from
a particular industry with a particular level of income and entertainment deductions
from the year prior. This group would then be subdivided into treatment and
control, and the same ratio would be used for all taxpayers in this subgroup.
A more sophisticated, yet still easily implementable, approach would use
multivariate regression analysis. The government would estimate two regressions,
one for the treatment group and one for the control group. Each would predict
reported income after the experiment as a function of variables from past years’ tax
returns. The precise form of the regression does not matter much for our purposes;
a simple multiple linear regression model might work well,59 or the government
might perform a nonlinear regression60 or even use machine learning techniques,
such as a neural network regression61 or a decision forest.62 The government can
thus calculate for each treatment taxpayer the ratio between the tax bill that would
be expected if the taxpayer were in the control group divided by the expected
unadjusted tax bill if in the treatment group. The ratio does not depend on the level
of entertainment deductions or income claimed by the taxpayer in the treatment
year. If the sum of liability applying this ratio does not produce precisely the
revenue-neutral amount, then all treatment taxpayers’ liability could be multiplied
by a constant to ensure exact revenue neutrality.
The taxpayers would be informed of the ratio calculated at the end of the
experiment and would receive a corresponding adjustment in liability. If the
treatment taxpayers are entitled to a discount as a result, they would receive interest
58

In a relatively small experiment, the government might calculate the ratio separately for each
treatment group taxpayer – that is, making the ratio equal to the average tax reported of all taxpayers
in the control group divided by the average tax reported of all taxpayers in the treatment group other
than the taxpayer affected.
59
See generally PAUL D. ALLISON, MULTIPLE REGRESSION: A PRIMER (1st ed. 1998).
60
See generally GEORGE A.F. SEBER & C.J. WILD, NONLINEAR REGRESSION (2003).
61
See Donald F. Specht, A General Regression Neural Network, 2 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NEURAL
NETWORKS 568 (1991).
62
See Weida Tong et al., Decision Forest: Combining the Predictions of Multiple Independent
Decision Tree Models, 43 J. CHEM. INF. COMP. SCI. 525 (2003).
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on the money for the period the government held it.63 In a reverse experiment where
taxpayers eventually pay more, if the taxpayers underestimated their final liability,
they might pay interest, just as a taxpayer who is responsible for quarterly estimated
tax payments may be required to pay interest when the quarterly payments are too
low.64 If final reconciliation of the experiment takes a while, for example because
some taxpayers fail to file their tax returns on time,65 the government could make
an initial adjustment a few months after the relevant taxable year and then a final
adjustment some time later. If finality is more important than exact revenue
neutrality, this final adjustment could be scheduled to come sooner rather than later.
These timing details aside, the statistical approach reduces the risk that
because of adverse selection, those who opt into the experiment are those with
characteristics that make them relatively immune to the tax law change at issue.
Such taxpayers could still opt in, but if the relevant characteristics are captured by
the model, then it would predict that these taxpayers’ liability would not change
much, and so the effect of the experiment on these taxpayers would be small. This
does not solve the adverse selection problem completely, however. The
independent variables are an incomplete list of factors that might affect taxpayers,
and taxpayers can be expected to have private information about their future
behavior.66 A taxpayer who plans to reduce its entertainment deductions for reasons
not apparent based on available data would be particularly likely to opt in.
3. Evaluation of Experimental Success
How can the government assess whether an experiment was successful?
One question is whether the experiment led to behavioral changes among taxpayers.
That might be discerned from tax returns filed, particularly if taxpayers in the
control group are required to report the same data that they would have reported if
they were in the treatment group, even if that data is no longer relevant in computing
their tax liability. In this example, treatment group taxpayers might reduce their
entertainment expenses. If entertainment expenses declined but gross income did
not, then that would indicate that entertainment expenses in fact are largely not
legitimate business expenses. More generally, the ratio of the decline in
entertainment expenses to the decline in gross income provides a proxy for the
success of the experiment. It is not obvious, however, what level marks the cutoff
63

The IRS often pays interest on overpayments. See I.R.C. § 6611.
Id. § 6654.
65
Taxpayers who file late must pay penalties. Id. § 6651. Such penalties, excluding interest, could
be included the comparison between the treatment and control group, to account for the possibility
that the tax regime may affect the timeliness of filing.
66
ROBIN BOADWAY, FROM OPTIMAL TAX THEORY TO TAX POLICY 50 (2012) (discussing the
importance of asymmetric information to tax policy analysis).
64
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between success and failure, particularly because what matters is the marginal
effect of the tax reduction on gross income.67
This possibility highlights two points: First, even when tax rules are
conventionally framed as binary choices, they often simply reflect polar points on
the spectrum. This is more obvious in the context of entertainment deductions than
in many areas of tax law, because businesses have long been allowed only partial
deduction of certain classes of entertainment expenses.68 Ideally, a process of
experimentation might lead the government to hone in on the efficient level of
permissible deductibility. Second, it will not always be straightforward to interpret
an experiment to determine whether it was successful or not, even as to the
taxpayers who opted in.69 Therefore, the strongest indication that a tax change is
efficient as to the taxpayers in the experiment is the mere fact that the taxpayers
opted into the experiment. So long as an experiment is revenue neutral, taxpayers’
willingness to opt into the experiment suggests that it is expected to leave the
taxpayers better off, with no adverse consequences for the fisc. Continued demand
from taxpayers to participate in subsequent iterations of the experiment would
strengthen this inference.
The inference, however, carries caveats. First, the experiment’s success
may not be generalizable to taxpayers who do not opt in. This highlights the
questions of how the government can scale up an experiment, a question to which
we will soon return.70 Second, the efficiency of a tax experiment may depend not
only on the effects of the tax on the taxpayers, but also the effect of the tax on third
parties. In the context of the entertainment deduction, for example, our analysis has
so far overlooked the clients who would have been wined and dined but no longer
received such benefits. Any loss of utility that these clients suffer might count as a
negative effect on social welfare. Or perhaps the effect is positive, if entertainment
expenses represent kickbacks that distort decisions of economic agents,71 especially
if public officials receive benefits.72 The lower the effects on third parties, the
stronger the case that a revenue-neutral tax reform will be welfare neutral as to
nonparticipants.

67

See Manoj Viswanathan, The Hidden Costs of Cliff Effects in the Internal Revenue Code, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. 931, 947 (2016) (“A taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, in contrast to a taxpayer’s average tax
rate, is an effective indicator of how the Internal Revenue Code affects a taxpayer’s decisions.”).
68
I.R.C. 274(n) (disallowing 50% of the deduction for most meal expenses).
69
Cf. infra Part II.A (considering generalizing experiments beyond initial participants).
70
See infra Part II.A.
71
See LEONARD J. BROOKS & PAUL DUNN, BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS FOR DIRECTORS,
EXECUTIVES & ACCOUNTANTS 388 (7th ed. 2015).
72
A taxpayer may not deduct business expense payments made in violation of state or federal law.
I.R.C. § 162(c)(2).
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4. Enhancement of Experimental Interpretability
An additional caveat is that experimental subjects may behave differently
than they would if they faced the same tax rules but outside an experimental
context. The problem arises in medical experiments when participants may be able
to deduce which group they are in.73 In social experiments, it is impossible to
conceal group assignments. Taxpayers can respond to the economic incentives of a
tax change only if they are aware of it, so there can be no placebo group.74
“Hawthorne effects” occur when members of the treatment group behave
differently because they know that they are in an experiment.75 Subjects might, in
a tax experiment, focus more on the relevant tax issue, giving it outsized
importance. Or subjects might be regret averse;76 that is, they wish to avoid feeling
regret for the decision that they have already made to opt into the experiment.77 In
the entertainment deduction experiment, an exaggerated cutback on expenses
reduces the risk that the taxpayer will find out that the taxpayer would have been
better off with status quo law.
Meanwhile, John Henry effects occur when subjects in the control group
behave differently than they would outside an experiment.78 Annoyed at not being
assigned to treatment, some might increase their entertainment expenses, so that
they can profit by deducting even more than they would have. Or, they might cut
back on such expenses, figuring they were planning to before being assigned to
control. Determining which scenario is more likely is an exercise in speculative
psychology. The premise of tax experimentation is that when taxpayers are faced
with direct economic incentives, the treatment group’s behavioral responses are
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See, e.g., Jefferson M. Fish, The Trouble with Double-Blind Placebo Studies, PSYCHOL. TODAY,
Nov. 23, 2010 (noting that patients often can determine whether a pill is a placebo or biologically
active),
available
at
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/looking-in-the-culturalmirror/201011/the-trouble-double-blind-placebo-studies.
74
Double-blind medical experiments typically include three groups: a control group, a placebo
group, and a treatment group. See, e.g., id.
75
See Stephen R.G. Jones, Was There a Hawthorne Effect?, 98 AM. J. SOC. 451, 452-53 (1992)
(describing experiments in which such effects were claimed).
76
See generally Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of
Rational Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON. J. 805 (1982) (defining and defining evidence for
regret aversion).
77
For example, litigants may accept settlement offers because they wish to avoid the possibility of
regret should they do worse at trial. See Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion
Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43.
78
See, e.g., Allen C. Barrett & Doris A. White, How John Henry Effects Confound the Measurement
of Self Esteem in Primary Prevention Programs for Drug Abuse in Middle Schools, J. ALCOHOL &
DRUG EDUC., Spring 1991, at 87, 99 (describing an observed John Henry effect).
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direct results of those incentives. But at least on the margins, psychological
considerations related to the experimental setting may play a role.
A related but distinct concern is that group assignment might affect
taxpayers’ reporting of their behavior. Control group taxpayers might decide to be
more honest in reporting their entertainment deductions, because they worry (even
if falsely) that government investigators will be more likely to find fraud. Or, miffed
at being assigned to control, such taxpayers might take shortcuts in reporting.
Meanwhile, even if reporting is required for individuals in the treatment group and
they face liability for misreporting,79 treated taxpayers might reason that their
entertainment deductions no longer factor into their tax liability and thus not bother
to collect all the underlying data. Or, they might reason that because the reported
expense values will not reduce their liability, they might as well overreport to avoid
any possible sanction for misreporting.
The tax authority might adopt various approaches to addressing these
issues. The first and often plausible is simply to ignore them. The tax authority’s
principal job is to produce summary data to inform taxpayers, who can then make
their own assessments of experimental results in deciding whether to opt in for
future years. If the ultimate measure of a revenue-neutral tax experiment’s success
is demand to receive the tax treatment, then what matters is simply that the
government report the data accurately. If, however, the goal is to enable both the
tax authority and the taxpayer to make informed rather than speculative decisions,
then some other approaches may be necessary if Hawthorne or John Henry effects
are expected to be large. The following subsections will consider other approaches
that will make experiments either to interpret.
a. Varying the Treatment
An alternative strategy for reducing the magnitude of Hawthorne and John
Henry effects is to define a range of treatment groups.80 For example, the
experiment might feature eleven groups in all, with one receiving no deduction, one
receiving 10% deductibility, and so forth. The group receiving the full deductibility
allowed under current law would be the control group, and it might be larger than
each other group.81 Hawthorne and John Henry effects seem likely to be most
79

Ordinarily, tax law imposes no penalty on taxpayers who fail to file but through withholdings
have overpaid their tax, because penalties are based on the size of the deficiency. See PatronikHolder v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 374, 380 (1993).
80
This is often described as a dose-response design. See WILLIAM M. HOLMES, USING PROPENSITY
SCORES IN QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS 18 (2014).
81
See, e.g., Simon Bate & Natasha A. Karp, A Common Control Group—Optimising the Experiment
Design
to
Maximize
Sensitivity,
9
PLOS
ONE
(2014),
available
at
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4263717/ (showing that with multiple treatments,
sensitivity for comparison with the control is maximized with a larger control group).
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pronounced at the extremes, when a taxpayer concludes that it is in the control or
receiving the full treatment. Some components of Hawthorne or John Henry effects
might gradually increase with the treatment level, but this approach would at least
isolate the components of these effects that emerge at the extremes. An
extrapolation of the trend between 10% and 90% to the extremes might be a more
reliable gauge for policy than the extremes themselves.
Eleven is not a magic number. Taxpayers could be assigned to a smaller or
larger number of groups. Revenue neutrality, however, must be retained. One
strategy for achieving this with multiple treatment groups would be to calculate
multipliers based on the performance of each treatment group individually,
comparing to the single control group. But unless the number of taxpayers is very
large, then the multiplier levels might be noisy, influenced by randomness within
the control group or a particular treatment group. Even if the control group and a
treatment group as a whole are representative, a particular taxpayer might be
matched82 through regression to a relatively small number of taxpayers in the
treatment group who had higher or lower than expected performance for reasons
having nothing to do with the experiment.
An alternative approach would be to develop a single integrated regression
model that allows a taxpayer’s expected income given prior years’ data to be
estimated based on the degree of deductibility. The regression might include a term
representing the degree of deductibility allowed, along with a square and perhaps a
cube of that term. The regression would also include all other variables from
previous years’ tax data that allowed for multipliers to vary within the treatment
group in the proposal.83 Each non-control taxpayer’s multiplier would then be
calculated as the taxpayer’s expected tax level if full deductibility were allowed
divided by the taxpayer’s expected unadjusted tax level given the actual level of
deductibility allowed.
Allowing for a wide range of treatment levels has an additional potential
benefit beyond helping to highlight Hawthorne and John Henry effects: It may help
identify tax changes where the optimum exists somewhere between the extremes.
Perhaps the optimal degree of deductibility for entertainment expenses is
somewhere between 0% and 100%, because spending money on entertainment
generally provides some consumption value but also contributes to taxpayers’
income. On the other hand, if an experiment seems to suggest a result relatively
The term “matching” is often used in statistics to refer to a particular experimental design that is
an alternative to regression, in which baseline characteristics are used to divide subjects into
treatment-control pairs. See, e.g., Ruta Brazauskas & Brent R. Logan, Observational Studies:
Matching or Regression?, 22 BIO. BLOOD MARROW TRANSPLANT 557 (2015). Whatever design is
used, taxpayers will be affected by those with similar characteristics.
83
See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
82
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near the zero-deductibility extreme, there may be a strong argument for tax law to
move all the way to that extreme, namely that eliminating deductibility altogether
is likely to reduce transaction costs.84 If for political or transaction costs reasons,
the law seems likely to settle at an extreme,85 no matter the experimental results,
then an experiment that simply compares a control group and a single treatment
group may provide for a cleaner comparison.
b. Two-Level Randomization
With two-level randomization, the government first identifies taxpayers for
whom the alternative regime might be appropriate. Then the government randomly
selects a subset of these eligible taxpayers to be invited to opt in. Some taxpayers
invited will decline. Of those who do opt in, some fraction must be randomly
assigned to the control group, while others are subject to the alternative tax regime.
Figure 1 illustrates these different groups.

84

For a discussion of transactions costs in the tax system, see Kneave Riggal, 17 VA. TAX REV. 295,
307-08 (1997).
85
The current treatment of entertainment expenses is at the extreme of complete disallowance. I.R.C.
§ 274(a)(1). But meals with clients are 50% deductible. Id. § 274(n).
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Figure 1. Two-Level Randomization

Eligible Taxpayers

Invited to opt in

Opt-Ins
Control
Group
(status quo
tax regime)

Treatment
Group
(alternative
tax regime)

Two-level randomization affords two levels of comparison. As before, the
government can compare nominal tax liability from those taxpayers subject to the
alternative regime (i.e., those shaded gray in Figure 1) to tax revenues from the
control group. But now, the government can also compare the tax returns of those
taxpayers who were not invited to opt in, despite being eligible, to the tax returns
of all taxpayers who were invited to opt in. Suppose, for example, that control group
taxpayers seek to make up for the misfortune of being placed in the control group
by working harder. This would be unfortunate for the members of the treatment
group, who would receive less of a tax discount than they otherwise would, making
the experiment seem less successful than it in fact was. The larger comparison
might identify this behavior.
It may seem counterintuitive to make a comparison involving many
taxpayers not participating in the experiment. One can, however, think of the
eligible-but-invited taxpayers as serving as a control group of a sort for the
treatment of being invited to participate in the experiment. Even if we assume that
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being invited to participate has no direct effect on behavior,86 Hawthorne and John
Henry effects can be seen as indirect effects of being invited into the experiment.
Two-level randomization allows for measurement of these indirect effects, which
are likely to be more attenuated than the effect of being chosen for the treatment
group but less susceptible to the Hawthorne and John Henry problems.
Two-level randomization thus might help allow better interpretation of
experiments. But if two-level randomization is used, the results also could be used
to calculate a second multiplier that would then be used to achieve more accurate
revenue neutrality. A simple approach would be simply to multiply the treatment
group’s total tax bills by a constant, applied on top of the original multiplier, to
ensure that the average tax revenues received from those invited to the experiment
are equal to the average tax revenues received from those eligible but not invited.
This would assure potential participants in a tax experiment that their ultimate tax
liability will not be affected by John Henry or Hawthorne effects arising from the
division into treatment and control groups. Alternatively, a multiplier might apply
to both the treatment and control group, or even to all taxpayers invited into the
experiment. Such an application might be justified on the ground of horizontal
equity, but it would effectively punish control group taxpayers who work harder as
a result of John Henry effects or reward those who work less hard as a result.
The tax adjustments to achieve revenue neutrality could be more
sophisticated still. A separate multiple regression could model the eligible-butuninvited taxpayers. The government would then be able to calculate the expected
tax liability of each member of the treatment group if that member had not been
invited to participate. This allows for an individualized second multiplier to be
calculated for each treatment group member. A third multiplier could then be
applied to all treatment group participants to achieve revenue neutrality. Arguably,
however, such adjustments may make the system too opaque. Thus, the tax
authority reasonably might seek to achieve revenue neutrality only with the first
layer of multipliers, even if using two-level randomization. At least, that might
make sense in early experimentation on experimentation. If large discrepancies
between eligible-but-uninvited taxpayers and invited taxpayers emerged, then such
refinements might be necessary.
c. Intent-to-Treat Randomization
Yet another approach would be for the government to conduct just a single
layer of randomization, but for that layer of randomization to be at the invitation
86

If the experiment is well-known even among those not invited, the nonreceipt of an invitation
might affect behavior. This can produce a sort of John Henry effect of its own. See supra note 78
and accompanying text. But these effects seem likely to be smaller than the effects on those who
have taken the affirmative step of trying to opt in.
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stage. The tax authority would invite only some eligible taxpayers to participate but
then allow all taxpayers who volunteer for the experiment to receive the alternative
tax regime. This approach is appropriate if there is relatively little reason to worry
that merely being offered or denied the alternative regime will change taxpayer
behavior. The approach may be useful if it is seen as undesirable to randomly pick
a taxpayer to participate in an experiment but then assign the taxpayer to the control
group. A standard statistical methodology called “intent to treat” can be used to
determine the statistical significance of the results, comparing results of those
offered the treatment (eligible and invited taxpayers) with those not offered it
(eligible but not invited), taking into account that many may decline the treatment.87
Revenue neutrality could then be achieved with a simple multiplier applied to all
invited and opting-in taxpayers, set at a level ensuring that revenues are equal
among invited and not-invited taxpayers.
B. Other Revenue-Neutral Tax Experiments
1. Deductions
a. Disallowing Other Deductions
The deduction for entertainment expenses has served as a useful example
of what could have been an alternative to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act because the
Act eliminated the deduction, while lowering rates. It is useful in part because it is
relatively trivial and uncontroversial, allowing us to focus on the merits of revenueneutral experimentation rather than the merits of the entertainment deduction itself.
Yet revenue-neutral experimentation also could have been used to assess the impact
of eliminating other deductions. For example, the tax reform reduced the
availability of the business interest deduction.88 A justification for this reform is
that the tax law previously advantaged equity relative to debt, because equity is
taxed twice.89 President Obama proposed to eliminate the deduction in part because
it increases leverage in the economy as a whole,90 making it “more susceptible to
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See Vikrant K. Bubbar & Hans J. Kreder, The Intention-to-Treat Principle: A Primer, 88 J. BONE
& JOINT SURG. 2097 (2006).
88
See Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13301 (amending I.R.C. § 163(j)).
89
See, e.g., CURTIS DUBAT, TAXATION OF DEBT AND EQUITY: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT
(Sept. 30, 2015), available at https://www.heritage.org/taxes/report/taxation-debt-and-equitysetting-the-record-straight.
90
THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM: AN UPDATE 8-9 (2016), available
at
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Frameworkfor-Business-Tax-Reform-An-Update-04-04-2016.pdf.
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severe downturns.”91 Others have argued that it would be better to eliminate the
double taxation of equity,92 or to allow a deduction based on a corporation’s
combined debt and equity.93 Meanwhile, there is a strong theoretical argument that
business interest should be deductible.94 A tax experiment might have assessed one
or more possible reforms. High demand to participate in such an experiment would
suggest a view that the current approach to business interest imposes significant
distortions. Meanwhile, the government or third parties could study how different
tax treatment affects decisions about whether to finance with debt or equity.
Another possible subject for experimentation before enactment would have
been one of the most controversial changes95 in the statute, the imposition of caps
on the deductibility of state and local taxes.96 Many commentators have claimed
that these caps represented a purely political calculation, as the states most
adversely affected by this change were those with high taxes, and such states are
generally “blue states” that lean Democratic rather than Republican.97 This
highlights that tax policy has distributional consequences, not just efficiency
consequences. Yet some argue that these deductions may cause states and localities
to oversupply goods that might be more optimally supplied by the market; 98
eliminating the tax allows taxpayers to be taxed on the consumption benefits that
they receive.99 There exist counterarguments100 and compromise proposals.101 A
revenue-neutral tax experiment on individual taxpayers could not allow full
examination of these issues, because such an experiment could not establish how
the existence of the deduction affects state and local policy. But it might highlight
91
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Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042 (amending I.R.C. § 164).
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See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under
the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 417 (1996).
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Kaplow, supra note 98, at 486 (noting that the deduction may promote spending on undersupplied
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whether taxpayers believe that the deduction distorts their own behavior, for
example by leading them to locate in areas with higher taxes.
b. Allowing New Deductions
Revenue-neutral tax experiments can also be used to test the efficiency of
new deductions. A tax experiment, for example, could be used to test the possibility
of reintroducing the entertainment expenses deduction. A taxpayer might believe
that the new tax regime is inefficient, causing the taxpayer to spend too little on
entertainment relative to other ways of recruiting clients. Such a taxpayer should
be willing to opt into an experiment in which the treatment group would receive the
deduction. The taxpayer would then be subject to a multiplier that would increase
nominal tax liability to ensure revenue neutrality. Thus, the participation carrot and
stick are reversed, but the experiment can be run as before. Similarly, experiments
could test reducing the limits on the business interest deduction and the state and
local tax deduction; such experiments could be executed simultaneously with
experiments on increasing the limits on such deductions.
Meanwhile, experiments could test the possibility of new deductions, such
as a commuting deduction, perhaps limited to the cost of commuting from a
workplace to the nearest location with a supply of affordable housing.102 More
ambitiously, an experiment might test a deduction for child care, perhaps limited to
married taxpayers who both have full time jobs. The current lack of deductibility
may lead parents (particularly mothers) not to re-enter the work force, even though
they would do so in the absence of tax distortions.103 A married couple might opt
into such an experiment because they anticipate that many in the control group will
not return to the work force. Couples in the treatment group might return to the
work force in greater numbers, paying the same level of taxes as the control group
on average but less than if they returned to the work force in the absence of the
experiment.
2. Income
a. Imputing Income
An alternative policy that might cure the same alleged inefficiency would
be to test imputing income to stay-at-home parents.104 The theory is that a parent
102

See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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who works at home in effect is paying herself to take a job, but her income from
doing so is not taxed. Economists sometimes argue that imputed income should be
taxable,105 but taxing imputed income seems politically infeasible. Even so, parents
might be willing to opt into an experiment in which time spent on childrearing,
perhaps just during work hours but perhaps more broadly, is taxed. Tax experiments
are not limited to questions of what count as deductions, and taxpayers might
volunteer to accept a greater tax base (leading to greater taxable income) in
exchange for lower tax rates (because of revenue neutrality). This experiment might
interest similar taxpayers as an experiment on a child care deduction, but there
could be some differences. Taxpayers who do not expect to be able to itemize
deductions, for example, might still be interested in an imputed income
experiment.106 Taxpayers with older children who can be left alone might prefer
this experiment as well.107
An argument against an imputed income experiment is that there is little
reason to conduct an experiment on a tax policy that ultimately will be politically
infeasible. On the other hand, perhaps experimentation might lead imputing income
to become more palatable, particularly in combination with other policies lowering
tax rates for parents. Even if this experiment is impractical, other imputed income
experiments might be feasible. The second greatest category of tax expenditure as
calculated by the Treasury arises from the lack of imputed income for rent from
owners of housing who live in their homes.108 A tax experiment might seek to move
tax to the “baseline tax system,”109 by imputing income for rent and then allowing
“a deduction for expenses, such as interest, depreciation, property taxes, and other
costs, associated with earning such rental income.”110 Such an experiment might
help eliminate distortions leading to excessive owner-occupied housing.111 In
principle, similar experiments could test other forms of imputed income.112
105
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b. Taxing Work Amenities
Beyond the question of imputed income, experiments on definition of
income can explore fundamental questions about whether the classic Haig113Simons114 model is appropriate or can test small deviations from the Haig-Simons
model. John Brooks critiques Henry Simon’s argument that “psychic benefits” in
income can be ignored because all workers are equally affected. 115 Brooks points
out that “[t]here is enough heterogeneity of psychic benefits across jobs and
individuals to make universal assumptions unreasonable.”116 In theory, a tax
authority might conduct a survey to rate the attractiveness of different jobs and
impose corresponding tax increase on relatively pleasant and cushy jobs—or,
equivalently given revenue neutrality, a tax decrease for unpleasant jobs. Taxpayers
might be willing to opt into such an experiment if, more than most such taxpayers,
they are willing to switch to a less pleasant job. A much more modest experiment
aimed at the same theoretical point might seek to tax amenities at work, ranging
from free meals117 to employee gyms.118
c. Changing Recognition Timing
Tax experiments also might apply to issues of timing. Some tax scholars
have advocated switching to a system in which investments could be marked-tomarket, meaning that taxpayers would recognize gains and losses each year even if
they do not sell the securities.119 A tax experiment might help evaluate some of the
criticisms of a marked-to-market system, such as that it imposes substantial
transactions costs,120 especially if the regime applies beyond publicly held securities
113

Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert Murray
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instruments like futures contracts and foreign currency contracts).
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See Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the
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to assets such as art.121 A significant complication with a tax experiment of this sort
is that the tax experiment must occur over a relatively long time horizon. We will
return to this issue, along to the related danger that participants in tax experiments
may seek to shift income into or out of the experimental period, below.122
3. Tax Procedure
Revenue-neutral tax experiments can also be used to test procedural
changes. For example, an experiment might test a regime in which the government
would agree to provide binding opinions on tax questions by phone or email.
Because taxpayers might then take advantage of mistaken statements of tax law by
tax authority employees,123 the treatment group would likely pay lower taxes than
the control group, leading to an ex post multiplier increasing tax rates. Ideally, the
ex post adjustment should also compensate for the extra expenses borne by the tax
authority in providing extra customer service to the treatment taxpayers.
Experiments could also test taxpayer-adverse procedural changes. For
example, some taxpayers with relatively complex returns (say, taxpayers with
foreign bank accounts) might opt into a regime in which those taxpayers agree to
submit with their tax returns a report submitted by a privately selected auditor. Such
taxpayers presumably would be less likely to engage in tax evasion. But in
expectation, they would pay no higher taxes than before, since the multiplier would
be less than one. Such an experiment could provide valuable information to the tax
authority. If the control group taxpayers reported much less in nominal taxes before
application of the multiplier, that would indicate a high degree of tax avoidance and
a high degree of effectiveness of a private audit requirement. If, on the other hand,
differences were small, incorporating the program into the baseline tax regime
would generate little revenue.
4. Radical Tax Reform
Revenue-neutral tax experimentation can be used not only to assess
relatively minor changes in deductions, but also plausibly significant differences in
policy. For example, scholars have proposed abolishing the corporate tax—which

Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A “Revolutionary”
Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 801-02 (1992) (discussing applicable rules for art
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122
See infra Part II.C.2.
123
Currently, when a taxpayer calling the IRS gets an answer from an IRS employee, the taxpayer
has no legal entitlement to rely on that answer. Emily Cauble, Detrimental Reliance on IRS
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historically took an average of 27% of each company’s profits124—and instead
granting the government a roughly equivalent claim on the corporation’s equity.
Thus, the government might receive 27% of a corporation’s stock.125 This reform
promises significant efficiency gains, as tax-minimization goals would no longer
distort decisions, and because corporations would no longer need legions of wellpaid tax advisors.126
It might seem that this is not amenable to a revenue-neutral tax experiment.
If the government receives equity, there is no way to ensure that the equity that the
corporation contributes will produce equal revenue over time. But a change in the
experimental design could enable the reform proposal to be tested. The government
could auction rights to some percentage of the tax revenue that it will receive from
both the treatment group and the control group. The government might then adjust
the ownership percentage that the government takes until both revenue streams sell
to the market for the same price. For example, the government might initially offer
27%, but then increase this if it was unable to find a sufficient number of purchasers
of the revenue stream at that price. As the government changes the ownership
percentage, some corporate taxpayers might change their mind about whether to
participate in the experiment. But ultimately, the government should be able to
identify an ownership percentage that is revenue neutral in expectation.
That does not mean that every radical tax reform is amenable to tax
experimentation. It seems unlikely, for example, that a value added tax could be
implemented on an experimental basis.127 A value-added tax requires each producer
to pay tax on the value it adds; so, for example, a producer purchasing a product for
$100 and selling it for $150 would pay tax only on the $50 difference.128 If enacted
economy-wide, then a combination of taxpayers in the value chain pay tax on all of
the $150. If only some producers were required to pay tax, the system could become
much more complex. Value-added taxes already create challenges of international
harmonization,129 but this would magnify those challenges on a domestic level.
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II. CHALLENGES FOR TAX EXPERIMENTATION

This Part addresses challenges for tax experimentation. Part II.A discusses
how the government can determine whether to scale up an experiment or transition
to a later stage of experimentation, such as an opt-out or involuntary experiment,
prior to enactment as general law. Part II.B addresses equity objections to tax
experimentation, considering both horizontal equity and after-tax income
inequality. Part II.C assesses whether taxpayers might be able to manipulate tax
experimentation to their advantage, and Part II.D explores whether tax experiments
can work with tax expenditures without adversely affecting other tax policy goals.
A. Transitions
1. Increased Scope
The goal of tax experimentation is to provide information that can change
baseline tax policy. Although appropriate experimental design can improve
policymakers’ ability to judge whether an experiment is a success,130 the most easily
accessible benchmark of success is simply participation. Given the constraint of
revenue neutrality, taxpayer demand to be in the experiment suggests that the tax
change is Pareto-improving, at least so long as the tax change does not induce
behaviors that have effects on third parties.131 But that leaves unclear whether the
experiment would benefit others. Perhaps other taxpayers who might benefit from
the experiment have not signed up simply because they did not know about it. But
they may have chosen not to enroll because they expect that they would do less well
under the experimental conditions.
Thus, a first step in transitioning from experiment to a tax law change is to
invite more taxpayers to receive the treatment. If in initial rounds only some
taxpayers were invited to participate in the experiment, then more might be allowed
to participate, still assigning the same proportion of enrollees to treatment and
control as before. With two-level randomization,132 for example, a higher
proportion of eligible taxpayers might be invited to participate. Alternatively or as
a supplement, a higher percentage of opt-ins might be selected for the treatment
group. Indeed, if an experiment continues to be successful, it is possible that all
taxpayers who wish to opt-in might ultimately be assigned to the treatment group.
At this point, the experiment ceases to be an experiment. Rather, it can be
seen as tax reform in and of itself, though of a different form from what one might
130
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expect. The tax reform amounts to giving taxpayers the option to elect a particular
tax regime in the subsequent year, in combination with a tax rate change. Tax law
already allows taxpayers to elect various options.133 If the change is still to aim at
revenue neutrality, then, as in the experiment itself, different taxpayers should
receive different rate reductions based on data from past tax returns. Without a
control group, it will be impossible to do this precisely, though the government
might approximate this by using data from when a control group still existed.
Making the treatment generally available will not likely reduce government
revenues, as those who did not opt in to the experiment in the past will tend to be
those who benefit less from the experimental treatment.
There may, however, be a strong reason not to allow all taxpayers into the
treatment group, even if all taxpayers (or at least all taxpayers who know about the
program and might plausibly be affected by it) would choose to opt in. Once an
alternative tax regime has expanded to be available as an option to all taxpayers
meeting specified criteria, then it becomes impossible to run an experiment
confirming that the alternative regime continues to produce at least as much tax
revenue as the generally applicable tax law. The same problem applies with
medical trials: once a drug is generally available, there must be “clinical equipoise”
if the drug is to be tested against placebo.134 Thus, the case for maintaining a control
group is similar to the case for revenue-neutral tax experimentation generally. Even
if only a few taxpayers wind up in the control group, this allows for continued study
of the tax rule, which may be especially important if the efficiency of the rule
changes over time. This is especially true with revenue-neutral experimentation,
since the control group serves a critical role in allowing the tax rate to vary across
treatment group taxpayers.
2. Opt-Out Experiments
A voluntary tax experiment can either be opt-in, where a taxpayer who takes
no action remains subject to generally applicable tax law, or opt-out, where a
taxpayer will be subject to the alternative tax regime without affirmatively taking a
step to elect generally applicable law. So far, we have assumed that all tax
experiments would be opt in. This approach fits better into the landscape of typical
randomized governmental experiments.135 Such experimentation is generally rare,
133
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but when the government has engaged in it, usually there is some benefit (e.g., a
welfare program,136 a child’s eligibility for a school voucher program137) that the
government makes available to volunteers (i.e., those who opt in). Randomization
thus has the dual benefit of allocating a scarce resource and providing the
government with better information. Moreover, such experiments help ensure that
experimentation is Pareto-optimal, since properly informed taxpayers will opt into
an alternative tax regime only if they expect it to increase their utility.
In an opt-in experiment, the government should provide a meaningful
disclosure to invited taxpayers. At least, such a disclosure should explain that
assignment to the treatment group will change the taxpayer’s baseline tax liability,
but that later adjustments will ensure that treatment taxpayers on average pay on
average the same amount of taxes as those in the control group. The disclosure
should also indicate how long the taxpayer will be subject to the treatment regime.
We have assumed that experiments would be for one year only, but taxpayers could
be placed into a treatment group for longer, particularly if the relevant tax
provisions affect behavior with long-lasting tax consequences, such as purchasing
depreciable assets.138
Such disclosures could also be used in opt-out experiments, and indeed may
be more important given that participation is the default. A transition from an optin to an opt-out experiment allows for an intermediate step, less drastic than
permanent experimental adoption. Behavioral economics teaches that there may be
large differences in responses depending on whether an experiment is opt-in or optout.139 Thus, a change in an experiment from opt-in to opt-out is a plausible strategy
for expanding the scope of an experiment, including far larger numbers of taxpayers
and reducing the risk that any beneficial experimental outcomes are due to selection
effects. The principal drawback is that opt-out creates the risk that many taxpayers
who would not wish to participate will be enrolled because of inertia or because
they ignored any information that they received about the experiment. Opt-out thus
does less to ensure that the alternative tax regime increases expected taxpayer
utility.
136
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Nonetheless, an opt-out experiment remains less coercive than an actual
change in the law. If the tax change being experimented with is a plausible
candidate for ultimate adoption into the tax code, then an opt-out experiment is a
modest step. Moreover, revenue neutrality may make opt-out experimentation less
problematic than it would be with some other experiments. Revenue neutrality does
not mean that a taxpayer should be indifferent as to which group the taxpayer is
assigner; after all, a primary justification for revenue-neutral experimentation is
that even revenue-neutral tax changes can benefit taxpayers. But revenue neutrality
is a significant constraint on tax experiments. Members of the treatment group will
be harmed only if the tax experiment in fact turns out to provide less efficient
incentives to those in the group. The tax authority presumably will choose
experiments that it believes have a substantial chance of producing some benefit,
so it taxpayers who fail to consider the merits of the experiment will likely not be
harmed by being in the treatment group.
3. Involuntary Experimentation
Revenue neutrality also makes an involuntary tax experiment more
plausible than involuntary social experiments ordinarily would be. At the least,
involuntary experimentation is a useful step after an opt-out experiment before a
tax law change is adopted for all taxpayers. If the experiment is to continue at this
stage, presumably the tax authority has concluded at least tentatively that the tax
change is beneficial. Thus, it seems likely that those placed in the treatment group
benefit relative to those in the control group. The virtue of an involuntary
experiment is that it eliminates concerns about selection effects, virtually ensuring
that any difference discerned between the treatment and control groups would apply
if the tax law change were made universal.
Some taxpayers who might not opt in to an opt-in experiment or who might
opt out of an opt-out experiment nonetheless might be happy to be included in an
involuntary experiment. This would not be true with most social experiments but is
a result of revenue neutrality. A taxpayer might believe that a revenue-neutral
elimination of the entertainment deduction would be efficient as applied to its
activities, but the taxpayer still might worry that the other taxpayers willing to
participate in a voluntary experiment are those who expect their entertainment
expenses to fall for largely exogenous reasons. This adverse selection is no longer
a concern with involuntary experimentation.
The argument for involuntary experimentation is thus akin to an argument
for mandatory purchases of insurance. Coverage requirements exist in part for this
reason in the automobile insurance market,140 and individuals are required to obtain
140
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health insurance under the Affordable Care Act for this reason. 141 In the health
insurance context, the worry is that relatively healthy good risks will decide not to
buy health insurance,142 making the market less attractive for slightly-less-good
risks and potentially leading to a “death spiral” in which no one buys insurance, 143
even though many would like insurance at actuarially fair rates. In this context, a
death spiral would be an experiment in which no one participates, even though
many would participate absent adverse selection. In principle, this prospect can
provide a normative case for involuntary experimentation even as the first step of
an experiment, though that might be politically untenable.
In the insurance context, however, a coverage requirement is equitable; all
drivers must purchase coverage, not half of drivers chosen at random. Whether
experiments are opt-in, opt-out, or mandatory, the prospect of horizontal inequity
is likely to be the most significant obstacle to tax experimentation. We thus turn to
that concern.
B. Equity
1. Horizontal Equity
a. The Case for Randomness
Horizontal equity is an often-cited tax policy, the gist of which is that people
with the same income should pay the same amount of tax.144 The concern that tax
experimentation might violate horizontal equity reflects the more general argument
that randomization of government policy is inherently unequal.145 If the government
randomizes taxpayers who have opted-into an alternative tax regime into a control
https://www.thebalance.com/understanding-minimum-car-insurance-requirements-2645473 (last
visited March 1, 2018) (noting that 47 states require automobile insurance)
141
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group, subject to the generally applicable law, then the control-group taxpayers are
arguably being treated inequitably. Similarly, with two-level randomization,
taxpayers who are eligible for an alternative tax regime, but who are not invited to
opt in, are arguably being treated inequitably compared to those invited.146
The general consensus in the literature has been that experimentation is
acceptable if there is a sufficient justification for the difference in treatment.147
Involuntary experimentation is most common in contexts in which individuals are
thought to have lost their rights as a result of committing crimes.148 In one notable
criminal justice experiment, domestic violence perpetrators in the Bronx were
randomly assigned to one of four different treatment programs.149 That experiment
concluded that treatment programs commonly employed throughout the nation for
batterers may not be effective.150 An experiment giving individuals who had not
been convicted of domestic violence incentives to enroll in various programs might
well seem inequitable.
The most common justification for randomization in government
experiments is scarcity.151 For example, experiments on supplements to the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC)152 have given the benefits to only some eager to
participate. 153 Because the government expects to lose money on each member of
the treatment group, revenue constraints limit the number of people included.
146
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I.R.C. § 32. See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 144, ¶ 37.1 (discussing the EITC in
detail).
153
An experiment called “Paycheck Plus” on supplementing the EITC for single workers without
children, for whom the EITC is very limited, has been ongoing in New York City and Atlanta,
Georgia. See Rachel Pardoe & Dan Bloom, Paycheck Plus: A New Antipoverty Strategy for Single
Adults, MDRC POL’Y BRIEF (May 2014), http://www.mdrc.org/publication/paycheck-plus/file-full.
This program involves both treatment groups (receiving the extra EITC) and control groups (who
do not). Id. at 4.
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Revenue neutrality might seem to weaken the scarcity justification for a tax
experiment, as neither group costs the government more than the other. For revenue
neutrality to work, however, there must be a control group, so that multipliers can
be calculated. Membership in the treatment group is thus inherently scarce.
A scarcity argument is much more difficult to make in the context of
involuntary experimentation. With a mandatory experiment, taxpayers forced into
the treatment group who may be treated inequitably. But this is just a question of
baselines. One could frame the treatment group as embodying new legal policy,
subject to confirmation of the experiment’s success. Then, membership in the
control group is scarce, and so treatment group members are not being treated
inequitably. The groups are being treated differently, but only because membership
in each group must be scarce for an experiment to proceed.
These arguments for scarcity may seem artificial, because the desired form
of taxation, whether it is the treatment or the control, could at least in principle be
given to all taxpayers, just not in the form of an experiment. But that is true with
all social experimentation. Indeed, even with medical experimentation, scarcity is
artificial. Presumably, all patients prefer the treatment, but we insist that they take
some risk of being placed in the control group because we are not sure that the
treatment is better than placebo.154 The baseline in which the patients do not have
access to the treatment is purely a result of law, both in the medical context and in
the tax context.
The ultimate justification for experimentation in both contexts is
informational.155 As with medical experiments, the justifiability of a social
experiment depends on an evaluation of whether the treatment has a significant
chance of being beneficial and of whether the experiment may succeed in producing
useful information. One might argue that tax experimentation is more troubling
than other legal experiments because horizontal equity is an important tax-law
goal.156 On this argument, it might be acceptable to have random experiments
concerning patent policy,157 whose primary goal is to maximize economic
efficiency,158 but less acceptable to allow inequalities to creep into tax policy. Some
tax scholars, however, have criticized horizontal equity as a meaningless concept.159
154

See Miller & Brody, supra note 26.
Abramowicz et al., supra note 147, at 965 (arguing that “random policy experimentation . . . will
produce better information than nonrandomized experiments”).
156
See supra note 144.
157
See, e.g., Ouellette, supra note 13.
158
Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 357–58, 377 (2010) (describing
the “reward” of exclusive patent rights as a “dominant justificatory theor[y] of patent law” that
“largely motivates current patent doctrine”).
159
See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 621 (1993) (arguing that horizontal equity lacks
155
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Indeed, economist Richard Musgrave argued that the only purpose of horizontal
equity was as a “safeguard against capricious discrimination — a safeguard which
might be provided equally well by a requirement that taxes be distributed at
random.”160
Tax law has long used randomization. For example, the IRS uses
randomization in selecting which taxpayers’ returns to audit.161 Experimentation
involving randomization would likely survive constitutional scrutiny. Tax
classifications are subjected to rational basis review, meaning they will be upheld
if “rationally related” to a “legitimate” government interest.162 Increasing taxpayer
utility while maintaining at least the same tax revenue is a legitimate government
interest,163 and randomization allows the government to pursue these interests.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly stated that the government has particularly
broad constitutional latitude with tax law.164
b. Ex Ante Insurance to Avoid Inequity
If the horizontal inequity of tax experimentation is still thought to present a
powerful objection, the government might seek to reduce the inequity. Allowing
treatment group taxpayers to choose to be in the control group or vice-versa would
“independent normative content, and that content must be supplied by reference to economic
assumptions and a theory of justice”); accord James R. Repetti & Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity
Revisited, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 135 (2012).
160
RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 160 (1959).
161
The IRS has three basic methods for selecting taxpayers to audit, two of which involve
randomization. First, some taxpayers’ returns have features that virtually always merit audit, such
as clearly missing income. See IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.1.5.1.11. Such audits are not
random. Second, the IRS has a highly confidential statistical methodology called the Discriminant
Index Function (DIF) that scores the likelihood of an audit that increases tax revenue; the higher the
DIF score, the greater the probability of being audited. Id. § 4.1.3.2. Third, pursuant to the IRS’s
National Research Program (NRP), some taxpayers are selected entirely at random. Id. § 4.22.1.5(5)
(“As randomly selected returns, NRP taxpayers can represent thousands of similar taxpayers in the
population.”). See generally Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited
Taxpayers, 41 CONN. L. REV. 161, 164–68 (2008) (discussing these three categories).
162
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983); Apache Bend Apartments,
Ltd. v. United States, 964 F.2d 1556, 1567 (5th Cir. 1992), rev’d on standing grounds, 987 F.2d
1174 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2079 (2012);
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
163
Colangelo v. United States, 575 F.2d 994, 998 (1st Cir. 1978) (maintaining tax collections is a
legitimate government interest).
164
Regan, 461 U.S. at 547 (“Legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications
and distinctions in tax statutes.”) (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1940));
Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (“[W]e have repeatedly pointed
out that [l]egislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in
tax statutes.”) (citations omitted).
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defeat the purpose of the experiment. But the government could seek to make it so
that taxpayers will ex ante be indifferent to which group the taxpayer is assigned.
The government might do this by offering taxpayers randomization
insurance. Suppose, for example, that equal numbers of participants (whether optins, non-opt-outs, or conscripts) are to be assigned to treatment and control. The
government could allow any taxpayer to pay $1,000 to purchase a unit of insurance
that would pay $2,000 if the taxpayer is assigned to the group that the taxpayer
prefers less. For example, a taxpayer who would like the treatment might purchase
for $10,000 insurance that would pay $20,000 if the taxpayer ended up assigned to
the control group. A risk-averse taxpayer should purchase enough insurance on the
initially less-favored option to make the taxpayer indifferent between the options.165
Because assignment to a group is a product of pure chance, there is no
danger of adverse selection with such insurance. An insurance payout is a lump
sum, rather than an entitlement to be taxed according to the other tax regime, so
there is also little danger that the insurance program will change the insureds’
behavior. Meanwhile, the program could be inexpensive to administer, with
insurance payments and payouts calculated on tax returns. For the government,
which is effectively risk neutral, to offer actuarially fair insurance has no expected
budget impact. Private parties could also offer such insurance, but the product is so
simple and so connected to the government program of experimentation that it is
likely easier for the government to offer the product directly. Actuarially fair
government insurance should be more popular than insurance in which much of the
insurance premium covers insurance company functions like rating and
underwriting.
2. After-Tax Income Inequality
The above analysis suggests that the intuition that tax experimentation
entails serious horizontal inequities is weak. Nonetheless, one might worry about
vertical inequities. Tax experimentation’s benefits may primarily flow to higherincome taxpayers, worsening after-tax income inequality, if tax experimentation is
opt in.166 This may happen for several reasons. First, higher-income taxpayers have
165

Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72
CAL. L. REV. 569, 601 (1984) (“If an individual is averse to risk and actuarially fair insurance can
be purchased (from a risk-neutral third party insurer), then it is not difficult to show that the
individual will completely insure against the risk.”).
166
This concern about worsening inequality is related to but not the same as “vertical equity.”
Vertical equity is the idea that there should be an “appropriate” pattern of differentiation between
those of different levels of economic income. McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 159, at 607; see also
Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 139, 140–
41 (1989). “The vertical equity principle,” however, “does not prescribe whether tax rates should be
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better tax advisors or more tax savvy (or both). They will thus be more likely to opt
into alternative tax regimes that they expect to benefit them. Second, higher-income
taxpayers may be subject to more complicated tax rules,167 thus creating more
opportunities for alternative tax regimes that benefit them. Third, wealthier
taxpayers tend to be less risk-averse.168 Even if the alternative regime appears ex
ante to offer a better expected outcome for the taxpayer, it may turn out to be worse
if circumstances change.169 This danger is more likely to scare off lower-income
taxpayers.
Arguably, even a policy that dominantly benefits wealthy taxpayers should
be seen as enhancing social welfare if other taxpayers are not harmed. Placing aside
externalities,170 revenue-neutral tax experimentation, unlike virtually all other
conceivable tax reform,171 is Pareto optimal,172 and Pareto improvements are often
thought to be welfare-improving,173 despite experimental evidence that people
sometimes are willing to accept Pareto-dominated outcomes.174 The argument
against tax law benefits for the wealthy that do not reduce resources to others
requires a modification of the Pareto criterion so that each person’s welfare depends

proportional, progressive, or regressive; nor, if progression or regression is the chosen mode, does
it indicate how steep the slope should be.” BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 144, ¶ 3.1.4; accord
McDaniel & Repetti, supra, at 610 (“The word ‘appropriate’ is not self-defining”); id. (“VE [vertical
equity] could apply to a tax system that is progressive, proportional or regressive.”).
167
The simplest tax return, the 1040EZ, can only be used by taxpayers with taxable income below
$100,000. See IRS, Which Form—1040, 1040A, or 1040EZ?, https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc352
(last visited March 1, 2018). The most complicated return, the 1040, includes numerous schedules
for more complex tax situations.
168
See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 55 n.31 (2d ed. 1989);
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Risk Aversion, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 90,
92–93 (1971).
169
For example, consider the example alternative tax regime in section Error! Reference source n
ot found. where taxpayers pay a lump-sum in exchange for lower marginal rates. Although the highearnings-potential taxpayer H may expect to benefit from this alternative regime, if H loses her job,
then H will be left much worse off than under generally applicable tax law, having to pay the lumpsum but getting no benefit from the lower marginal rates.
170
See infra Part II.D.
171
See, e.g., Arthur Cockfield, Income Taxes and Individual Liberty: A Lockean Perspective on
Radical Consumption Tax Reform, 46 S.D. L. REV. 8, 42 (2001) (noting that “any type of radical tax
change” is likely to violate the Pareto criterion, at least in the short term).
172
A pareto improvement is one that makes some better off and no one worse off. See JOHN BLACK
ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 301 (4th ed. 2012).
173
For a defense of using the Pareto principle in policy analysis, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1015 (2001).
174
See, e.g., Dorothea K. Herreiner & Clemens Puppe, Inequality Aversion and Efficiency with
Ordinal and Cardinal Social Preferences—An Experimental Study, 76 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 238
(2010).
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on relative wealth.175 Revenue-neutral tax experiments from which wealthy
taxpayers benefit may still be Pareto-improving, however. In the example of the
entertainment deduction, it seems unlikely that the utility of non-wealthy taxpayers
falls because wealthy taxpayers reallocate spending from the entertainment
category. Indeed, such a change plausibly might reduce the perception of
inequality, as opting-in taxpayers have lower after tax income. Thus, if inequality
is measured solely through a measure like the Gini coefficient, 176 inequality is
reduced.177 In this case, experimentation might produce greater inequality of
happiness, but not greater financial inequality.
Suppose, however, that tax experimentation is thought to increase
inequality under some definition sufficiently to outweigh any efficiency benefits.
At least in principle, any benefit accruing to high-income taxpayers could be
reallocated in part to low-income taxpayers. That is, if high-income taxpayers
expect to receive a utility benefit equal to $1,000 from some sort of tax
experimentation, then the law creating such experimentation could impose a new
tax on higher-income taxpayers and redistribute the receipts to lower-income
taxpayers. This argument is frequently made on behalf of programs that increase
economic efficiency but may have negative redistributive consequences, 178 and it
leads to the retort that the mere possibility of redistribution does not justify a policy
if the law creating the efficient policy does not effect redistribution.179 In principle,
however, a hypothetical statute that authorized tax experimentation in conjunction
with other progressive tax changes could answer the distribution objection.
C. Manipulation
Taxpayers may attempt to exploit the availability of tax experiments180 in
several ways. First, taxpayers who know about an experiment may change their
175

See Sven Ove Hansson, Welfare, Justice, and Pareto Efficiency, 7 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL
PRAC. 361 (2004) (suggesting such an adjustment); Khandakar Qudrat-I Elahi, Economic Inequality
and Paretian Welfare Economics: Some Insinuating Questions, 35 FORUM SOC. ECON. 19 (2005)
(critiquing the Pareto criterion given concerns about inequality).
176
See Corrado Gini, Concentration and Dependency Ratios, 87 RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA
769 (1997) (providing English translation of Gini’s 1909 article in Italian).
177
The Gini coefficient is generally reported as a function of household income. See, e.g., JESSICA
L. SEMEGA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2016 at 8
(Sept. 2017). Household income would not include deductible business expenses.
178
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the
Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000).
179
See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics,
100 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (2016) (arguing that just as transactions costs can prevent achievement of
efficiency goals, so too can political action costs prevent achievement of distributive goals).
180
See David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 869 (1999)
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behavior to become eligible to be invited into the alternative regime. Relatedly,
taxpayers may change their behavior or their reporting so that they are matched to
taxpayers in the control group likely to pay low taxes. Second, taxpayers subject to
an alternative tax regime may minimize their taxes by shifting gross income and
deductions between the tax years subject to the alternative regime and tax years not
subject to the alternative regime. Third, taxpayers may change their tax status. We
will consider each of these in turn.
1. Eligibility and Matching
Some taxpayers always attempt to game the tax laws to their advantage, and
the same will doubtless be true of eligibility for tax experiments. Tax experiments
might be limited to particular taxpayers, such as members of a particular industry.
For example, the government might consider limiting eligibility for an experiment
on eliminating deductibility of travel expenses to an industry in which such
expenses generally seem unnecessary, such as health professionals who currently
can deduct trips to conferences at fancy vacation destinations.181 This is, however,
an incomplete solution. A taxpayer who does not expect to need to take significant
travel deductions anyway might seek to classify as a health professional, even if the
taxpayer’s business is only marginally related to health.
A taxpayer might have similar manipulation incentives even in an
experiment for which the taxpayer is clearly eligible or for which there are no
eligibility limitations. Recall that after a treatment group taxpayer calculates tax
liability under the new rules, this amount is multiplied by a number chosen to ensure
revenue neutrality. That multiplier is based on the quotient of the tax liability one
would expect the taxpayer to have based on the taxpayer’s past data if assigned to
the control group divided by the nominal tax liability expected if assigned to the
treatment group. If the government uses a multivariate regression, the taxpayer
hopes to have characteristics that lead to a prediction that the taxpayer will have
much higher nominal liability in the treatment group. A taxpayer planning ahead
may be able to generate data in a year before the experiment that will lead to such
predictions.
The taxpayer’s manipulation incentives will be the opposite in a tax
experiment assessing the efficiency of a new deduction. Then, the taxpayer would
like to be matched to other participants whose behavior will change the least. For
example, if the experiment considers the possibility of a new deduction for certain
commuting expenses, then the taxpayer would like to be matched with taxpayers
(“Uncommon transactions that are taxed inappropriately become common as taxpayers discover
how to take advantage of them.”).
181
Cf. http://www.doctorsreview.com (allowing search for medical conferences based on desired
destination).
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who are likely to receive only a small benefit from the availability of the commuting
deduction. A taxpayer who can claim a large amount for an experimental new
deduction will be able to keep most of this benefit, if the regression predicts that
the taxpayer’s nominal taxable income would be similar whether the taxpayer is in
the control or treatment group. In an extreme case, a taxpayer might move very
close to work in the year before the experiment and then move much further away
in the experimental year.
The tax authority might take several steps to limit the success of such
manipulation. First, the government might define the relevant tax provision
narrowly to reduce such gaming. The travel experiment might affect only
deductions for travel to health-related conferences, and the commuting deduction
might be eligible only for taxpayers who live a certain distance from work. Second,
the government can keep manipulable eligibility criteria and the variables used to
match taxpayers confidential. The IRS already does something similar, keeping
confidential the criteria that affect the probability that the IRS will audit a
taxpayer.182 On the other hand, there may be value in publishing such data to allow
the public to better inform itself about whether an experiment was successful.
Third, the government can use older data that predate the announcement of the
experiment (not just data that predate the experimental year) to filter out
opportunistic taxpayers. Fourth, the government might collect and then heavily
weight data not easily manipulated by taxpayers, such as the college or graduate
degrees received by the taxpayer, or the industry of past employers.
Ultimately, some manipulation is still likely to occur on the margins. The
problem, however, should not be overstated. Tax law already presents many
opportunities for fraud, and criminal and civil liability may deter many taxpayers
from fraudulently filling out their tax returns in the hope of receiving a deduction.183
If, nonetheless, many taxpayers seek to define themselves in a way that they
anticipate will lead to better treatment, the strategy will be self-defeating. For
example, if many non-health professionals classified themselves as health
professionals, then the non-health professionals would be matched with many other
non-health professionals. The problem is then reduced to the danger that real health
professionals would not want to participate in the experiment, for fear of being
matched with non-health professionals. But if the experiment failed for this reason,
that would simply be an indication that the underlying hypothetical tax provision
(elimination of a deduction but only for health professionals) is unworkable because

IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.1.3.2 (“DIF mathematical formulas are confidential and
for official use only. The DIF score assigned to a return should not be disclosed.”).
183
If the federal government has insufficient resources to prosecute tax fraud, qui tam suits could
enable greater enforcement. See Franziska Hertel, Note, Qui Tam for Tax? Lessons from the States,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (2013).
182
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the eligibility criteria are easily manipulated. This itself is a valuable lesson for a
tax experiment.
2. Income and Deduction Shifting
Taxpayers who are subject to an alternative tax treatment may try to
minimize their taxes by shifting income and deductions from years in which they
are subject to the treatment to years when the generally applicable tax rules apply
to them. Or, taxpayers may try to shift gross income and deductions in the opposite
direction, to a year covered by the alternative tax regime. For example, if the
alternative tax regime were a lower marginal rate of taxation in exchange for losing
a deduction, a taxpayer may shift as much income as possible into years covered
by the alternative regime. The taxpayer might do this by negotiating with their
employer to forgo a bonus in a year subject to generally applicable tax law, with
the understanding that the taxpayer would receive a larger bonus the next year,
when the alternative regime would apply. Meanwhile, in the opposite type of
experiment, where the taxpayer expects to pay a higher tax rate, the taxpayer could
seek to shift income to a later year.
These problems can be addressed. The alternative tax regime could apply
for multiple years to minimize the potential for short-term mischief. Taxpayers
might be informed of their group assignment on January 1, to prevent any
manipulation in advance of the experiment. For each year of the experiment, a
separate model would be developed of the behavior of control group and treatment
group taxpayers, and so the multiplier a taxpayer receives would vary from year to
year. The government would assess the experiment on a year-to-year basis, and it
might focus analysis especially on taxpayers entering the first year of the
experiment, since income shifting is likely to be most plausible near the end of an
experiment. In principle, an experiment could even be designed to be permanent.
A taxpayer giving up a deduction would be giving that deduction up permanently,
and each year would receive some discount in exchange. If the tax law changed so
that no taxpayers received this deduction anymore, then the multiplier would end
up being closer to 1.
A less drastic approach is for the separate tax treatment to apply only during
the experimental period (perhaps even just a year), but for a multiplier to be
calculated for each taxpayer for each subsequent year. This addresses the concern
that even if an experiment is revenue-neutral during the period of the experiment,
it might not be revenue-neutral afterward. So long as the multiplier approach is used
in all subsequent years,184 the experiment is guaranteed to be revenue neutral over
184

Eventually, too few taxpayers might remain living to enable meaningful comparison of the
treatment and control groups. At this point, it would likely be appropriate to use data from previous
years.
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taxpayers’ entire lives. Thus, if treatment taxpayers were shifting income into the
years of the experiment, they would receive large discounts during this time, but
they might report less nominal tax liability after the experiment ends and therefore
have to pay higher tax rates then.
The length of the experiment aside, tax law includes tools to discourage
gaming. Auditors should be advised to rigorously apply the existing tax-law
doctrines that prevent shifting gross income and deductions between years, such as
the constructive receipt doctrine185 and the economic performance doctrine.186
Meanwhile, the government might prioritize experimenting with alternative tax
regimes that limit the scope of income-shifting. Capital gains, for example, might
be particularly easy to shift,187 and so the government might prioritize tax
experiments that apply to only ordinary income (i.e., income that is not capital
gains).188
3. Status Changes
Individuals can get married or divorced; corporations can merge with others
or divide into multiple corporations (e.g., by spinning off a business into a new
corporation). If a taxpayer is subject to an alternative tax regime, how would such
status changes apply? The rules governing such status changes must be designed
with care to prevent opportunistic, inefficient behavior. For example, suppose that
company T is a treatment group taxpayer subject to an alternative tax regime, while
company A is not—but A is in a position so that the alternative regime would reduce
its taxes, because it would benefit from the experiment more than most members of
the treatment group. Suppose further that it makes no economic sense for A to
acquire T, aside from tax considerations. If A could become subject to the
alternative regime by merging with T, the result would be an economically
inefficient merger, plus a tax windfall to A.

185

This doctrine prevents cash method taxpayers (which are the vast majority of individual
taxpayers) from postponing the reporting of gross income by failing to exercise the power to collect
it. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 144, ¶ 5.9.
186
This doctrine prevents accrual method taxpayers from taking a deduction before they have
provided economic performance, such as delivering goods or services to the buyer. I.R.C. § 461(h).
See generally STEPHEN GERTZMAN, FEDERAL TAX ACCOUNTING ¶ 4.04[3] (2016 ed.).
187
Joseph J. Cordes & Harvey Galper, Tax Shelter Activity: Lessons from Twenty Years of Evidence,
38 NAT’L TAX J. 305, 322 (1985) (when capital gains rates are low, investments shift to activities
generating capital gains).
188
Many other countries’ tax systems have very different treatment for income from capital and
income from labor. See, e.g., KLAUS SIEKER, PORTFOLIO 7140: BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN GERMANY
¶ IV.B.1 (1st ed. 2017 rev.) (discussing Germany’s special treatment of capital income like
dividends and interest); cf. I.R.C. § 64 (defining “ordinary income”).
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Further, status changes can complicate the goal of achieving revenue
neutrality. The multiplier that would be applied to T’s nominal tax liability depends
on T’s pre-experiment tax returns. But if T is suddenly much larger after acquiring
A, paying far greater taxes, that would have the effect of lowering the taxes of all
treatment group taxpayers. The average multiplier will be equal to the total tax
liability of control group taxpayers divided by the total nominal tax liability of
treatment group taxpayers, so increasing the denominator reduces the multiplier.
This would particularly be a problem if treatment group taxpayers are
systematically more likely to acquire other companies than control group taxpayers.
The reverse tendency would also create problems of evaluation.
But tax law already deals with similar problems of status changes.189
Individuals’ divorces and corporations’ dividing are easy. If a married couple is
subject to an alternative tax regime, and they get divorced, then both ex-spouses
should remain subject to the alternative regime. If a corporation is subject to an
alternative regime and divides, such as by spinning off a business into a new
corporation,190 then both the original corporation and the spun-off company will
remain subject to the alternative regime.191 The model used to determine multipliers
would be generated based on the combined nominal tax of any spouses or pair of
companies that split up. Then, the multiplier would apply equally to each spouse
paying separately or to each entity.
Marriages and especially corporate mergers are more complicated. To
prevent marriages from affecting tax liability, the most straightforward approach is
to require all participants in an experiment to file individually, whether as a single
individual or as married filing separately.192 This would be true even for control
group taxpayers, to facilitate the comparison between the control group and the
treatment group. The drawback of this approach is that eliminating the option to
file a joint return will be disadvantageous to some taxpayers. Although some
189

See, e.g., I.R.C. § 382 (dealing with corporate tax attributes like Net Operating Losses in the
context of corporate acquisitions).
190
E.g., I.R.C. § 355 (providing tax rules for corporate separations like spin-offs, split-offs, and
split-ups).
191
Cf. BORIS BITTKER & JAMES EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS &
SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 11.12 (7th ed. 2000 & Supp. 2015-02) (discussing how, in a corporate separation
under I.R.C. § 355, certain tax attributes are continued).
192
Some circumstances already exist where one spouse’s unusual tax situation bars a married couple
from filing joint returns, including one spouse using the calendar year as their calendar year and the
other spouse using a different taxable year, I.R.C. § 6013(a)(2), and one spouse being a nonresident
alien, id. § 6013(a)(1). See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 144, ¶ 111.5.2 (discussing
married-filing-jointly returns versus married-filing-separately returns in depth). Moreover, filing
separately sometimes allows taxpayers to get certain tax benefits that would not be available (or not
as available) if filing jointly. See id. (discussing how filing separately can maximize the deduction
under I.R.C. § 213(a)).
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taxpayers suffer a “marriage penalty,”193 others enjoy a “marriage bonus,”194 and
under current U.S. tax law, the married-filing-separately status is generally seen as
disadvantaged relative to the others,195 with some exceptions.196 Thus, taxpayers
might elect to participate in tax experiments only if they are willing to forego this
option. The best long-term solution might be for all taxpayers to file separately.197
While this would be a significant change in U.S. law, most developed countries
have always had individual filing or have made this switch in recent decades,198 and
there are strong arguments that the United States should switch as well.199 Of
course, a tax experiment might be used to determine whether to eliminate this
option in the United States. Meanwhile, there is no impediment to tax
experimentation in countries with individual filing.
In corporate mergers,200 where the target company is subject to an
alternative regime but the acquiring company is not, there are two possible options.
First, the target may be required to maintain separate corporate form as the
acquirer’s subsidiary,201 and continue to file its own separate tax return using the
alternative tax regime, without the option of consolidating its returns with the
acquirer’s.202 So long as the acquirer and the target remain legally separate entities,
193

See, e.g., Margaret Ryznar, A Practical Solution to the Marriage Penalty, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 647,
653-58 (2017) (providing statistics and history).
194
For a detailed statistical analysis of who receives a penalty and who receives a bonus under
current tax law, see Amir El-Sibaie, Marriage Penalties and Bonuses Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act, TAX FOUNDATION (Feb. 14, 2018), available at https://taxfoundation.org/tax-cuts-and-jobs-actmarriage-penalty-marriage-bonus/.
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See, e.g., Ryznar, supra note 193, at 655 (“Filing separately is, on average, not advantageous
because fewer credits and deductions are available, and the tax brackets are narrower than those of
single filers.”).
196
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the accounting is straightforward. A complication here is that the combined entities
might engage in transactions seeking to take advantage of the differential tax
treatment of the two entities. This problem is familiar to tax law,203 with transfer
pricing regulation seeking to ensure that transactions reflect what parties would
agree to in arms-length negotiations.204
Second, the target may be allowed to fully merge and consolidate with the
acquirer, but the combined corporation would have to calculate its taxes once using
the alternative regime and a second time using the default regime. The actual tax
liability would be a weighted average of the two, in proportion to the relative value
of the target and acquirer at the time of the merger.205 The proportion of nominal
tax liability attributable to the treatment group entity would be used in modeling
the effects of the experiment more broadly. The principal challenge with this
approach is valuation. If the target and acquirer are public corporations, then their
stocks’ market capitalization can be used to determine valuation.206 In other
circumstances, the relative valuations might be a matter of dispute between the tax
authority and the taxpayer, as the taxpayer might seek a larger or smaller
capitalization based on which tax treatment seem more attractive. The costs of such
gaming are likely to be low, however, given that the revenue-neutrality constraint
is unlikely to make either option much more attractive than the other. Nonetheless,
the transactions costs associated with arguing about valuation might discourage
corporate participation in experiments on relatively minor tax code provisions.
D. Externalities
Many tax provisions, such as business expense deductions,207 exist to
properly calculate taxpayer income.208 But other tax provisions are “tax
to the dividends received deduction at I.R.C. § 243(a)(3).
203
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expenditures” that further some additional goal,209 such as creating positive
externalities or reducing negative externalities.210 A potential objection to tax
tailoring is that allowing taxpayers to opt out of such externality-addressing tax
expenditures will adversely affect third parties. For example, the R&D tax credit211
is often defended as encouraging scientific research that will benefit society as a
whole,212 because companies cannot appropriate the full value of their research
efforts.213 Similarly, tax expenditures subsidizing higher education214 are justified
by its positive externalities.215 Other examples include the various credits,216
deductions,217 and exclusions218 subsidizing energy-efficiency and clean-energy, all
of which are justified as reducing the negative externalities from fossil fuels.219
An argument can be made for preventing alternative tax regimes from
removing such tax expenditures. Similarly, the absence of some deductions could
be justified on externality grounds. For example, the absence of a deduction or
exclusion for the cost of gas used commuting by car220 might be justified partly by
209
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environmental considerations.221 Allowing taxpayers to opt into such a deduction
in exchange for higher tax rates might reduce social welfare. Thus, the tax authority
should hesitate to offer a tax experiment that would eliminate for treatment
taxpayers a tax provision justified (or justifiable) based on its effects on others.
There may be some situations, however, in which concerns about
externalities could be addressed by changing the unit offered the alternative tax
regime. Consider, for example, the home-mortgage interest deduction.222 The
deduction’s defenders argue that it encourages homeownership, producing positive
externalities including better-maintained neighborhoods and greater social capital
in neighborhoods.223 Allowing opting-into an alternative tax regime without the
home-mortgage interest deduction (in exchange for lower rates) might then have
negative effects on neighborhoods.
A response to this problem would be to allow entire neighborhoods (or
entire collections of neighborhoods) to opt into such alternative regimes.
Specifically, the decisions to opt in could be made by a home-owners association
(HOA) or a municipality. This election would “run with the land,” so that home
mortgage interest could never be deducted for a home within that HOA or
municipality, but any taxpayer principally residing in a home would benefit from
the lower rates. The opt-in is thus “in rem,” attaching to the property (i.e., the
homes), regardless of whether it is subsequently transferred. Allowing the opt-in to
be done by the HOA or the municipality ensures that externalities are internalized
at the level making the decision to opt in. This would, of course, require enabling
legislation, above and beyond that needed for tax experimentation in general.
Random assignment of some HOAs or municipalities that opt-in to a control
group would allow rigorous determination of whether the home mortgage interest
deduction produces the predicted neighborhood benefits. In theory, the deduction
should lead to more investment in housing, so assuming the experiment includes at
least some not-yet-developed land, one should expect that such land would be more
likely to be developed than corresponding land in the control group. Property values
similarly ought to be higher in areas with the deduction than without, as those in
the treatment group allocate more of their money to non-house spending.224 Of
course, if the primary goal of an experiment were informational, then a home
221
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mortgage interest deduction experiment with individual subjects might be more
effective. If the deduction truly has externalities, then one should expect houses
near those randomized to the treatment of giving up the deduction to decline in
value relative to houses near those randomized to control.
The government also might be able to experiment with tax provisions
thought to provide positive externalities by defining a new treatment group that is
designed to promote externalities but in a different way. For example, the
government might consider replacing the R&D tax credit with a system in which
the government directly grants subsidies in the form of tax credits to companies
based on the quality of their research proposals or the importance of research
undertaken.225 Such an experiment could still be revenue neutral. Taxpayers might
be willing to opt in, if they think they would benefit from greater tax benefits for
more important research, with reduced tax benefits for less important research. The
government might then seek to evaluate both whether the change is attractive to
taxpayers and whether the change indeed produces more valuable research. As with
assessing externalities from the home-mortgage interest deduction, this analysis
would require data beyond that available from tax returns.
III. BEYOND REVENUE NEUTRALITY

A. Participation Inducements
Perhaps the most significant challenge to tax experimentation is that few
taxpayers may agree to participate. Opting in to an experiment requires some
research into the tax law issue. Taxpayers also need to assess the possibility of
adverse selection. Once again, if the taxpayers most likely to participate are those
with private information that they would gain greatly from a tax law change, then
taxpayers who expect to benefit only slightly with respect to their nominal tax
liability should be expected to lose money once revenue-neutral adjustments apply.
Above, 226we discussed one solution to adverse selection that makes taxpayers
hesitant to participate: designating an experiment opt-out or even mandatory. But
we also recognized strong arguments against such an approach to these strategies.
An alternative possibility would be for the government to offer inducements
to taxpayers willing to participate. All taxpayers who opt into the experiment, or
perhaps only those assigned to treatment, might receive some tax discount (perhaps
a small percentage discount on their tax returns). Even relatively modest
inducements might be sufficient to overcome adverse selection problems. With
225
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such participation inducements, tax experimentation would not be truly revenue
neutral; treatment group taxpayers would be promised that they would pay less on
average. The government would be sacrificing revenue for the information to be
obtained from a tax experiment. But taxpayers in the treatment group would still be
matched to control group taxpayers. This has the useful effect of ensuring that
taxpayers will be willing to participate only if they believe that the tax changes will
not overly distort their own incentives.
The government might offer inducements for particular experiments, but it
also might offer inducements to taxpayers willing to participate in a wide range of
tax experiments. The government might simultaneously execute a wide range of
experiments on various tax issues. This can help limit adverse selection. Because
taxpayers will anticipate that the chances of being randomized into the treatment
group of any particular experiment will be relatively low, participation is not likely
to be limited to taxpayers who expect to benefit disproportionately from that tax
experiment.
B. Experiments on Tax Rates
Participation inducements also can be used to facilitate experiments on tax
rates. Consider, for example, a tax experiment in which some taxpayers will be
randomly selected to pay an extra two percent in taxes, while others receive a three
percent discount on their taxes. The purpose of such an experiment would be to
assess the effect of the level of taxation on other variables, such as taxpayer work
effort and job creation. These are among the most contentious issues in tax policy,227
but randomized studies have been unavailable,228 and interpretive issues make it
virtually impossible to generalize from existing evidence about long-term effects
of marginal tax rate changes.229 An important question for policymakers is whether
higher tax rates reduce taxpayers’ willingness to work—that is, whether the income
or substitution effects of taxes dominate.230
227
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Such experiments might produce greater objections than revenue-neutral
experimentation, because the horizontal inequities resulting are greater. This is
indeed a principal reason that this Article has focused on revenue-neutral
experimentation. Nonetheless, the possibility of such experiments should not be
dismissed, because they would produce a form of data otherwise almost impossible
to obtain. Moreover, we have seen above that concerns about horizontal inequity
may be overstated. Taxpayers might purchase insurance against being randomized
to the group that receives a tax increase,231 with such insurance paying an ex ante
lump sum to such taxpayers. That would limit the experiments’ usefulness in
providing insight into the effects of overall wealth on individual behavior, but such
experiments could still help identify marginal incentive effects of government
policy.
With revenue-neutral tax experiments, an experiment can often be
considered successful simply on the basis that informed taxpayers would prefer the
treatment group to the control group. With non-revenue-neutral experiments, the
mere existence of participating taxpayers cannot be a strong argument in favor of
the policy. Still, success might be measured based on the effects of the experiment.
For example, if an experiment demonstrated that taxpayers who suffered an
increase in the tax rate did not reduce work effort as measured by pretax income,
or even increased work effort, that would furnish an argument in favor of increasing
the tax rate. On the other hand, if an increase in the tax rate in fact lowered tax
revenues, that would indicate that the government was already on the wrong side
of the Laffer Curve232 and that a tax increase would not be advisable. Between these
extremes, analysts might reach different normative conclusions.
C. Self-Executing Tax Experiments
How should the tax authority decide whether to expand an experiment when
it shows some effects that would be generally viewed as beneficial and some that
would be generally viewed as harmful? And at what point should the legislature
make a tax provision permanent? These are fundamentally political trade-offs, that
experimentation can produce information but that public officials ultimately must
decide how to act based on such information. But a legislature authorizing tax
experimentation could specify ex ante what the consequences of such an
experiment might be. For example, a legislature authorizing an experiment on a tax
rates change, then there should be no income effect, but virtually any tax reform will affect both
inframarginal and marginal tax rates.
231
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232
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increase might provide that the tax increase will be applied to all taxpayers so long
as the experiment establishes that a 1% increase in tax leads to no more than a 0.5%
decrease in work effort.
Such self-executing experiments233 can facilitate legislative transparency
and honesty. During the debate on the recent tax reform, brief consideration was
given to the possibility of a trigger that would automatically increase tax rates if
revenues fell short of projections, but the Senate parliamentarian rejected the
plan.234 The virtue of such a trigger is that it punishes cheap talk. A legislator
endorsing a tax cut can make more credible the legislator’s claimed revenue
projections by agreeing to a trigger. But there are problems with such a trigger as
well.235 Revenue may fall short of projections for exogenous reasons, such as a
recession. Moreover, increasing taxes would generally be a poor fiscal policy
response to a recession. Taxes generally fall during recessions, and this “automatic
stabilizer” may reduce the extent of the economic downturn.236 An experiment,
however, can provide a better measure of a policy’s effects, because the treatment
group is compared to the control group. Thus, if legislators favor a tax cut because
they believe that it will largely be self-financing, it might make sense for the tax
cut initially to be experimental, with the result of the experiment determining
whether the tax cut should be made permanent.
A reasonable objection is that it will be difficult to craft in advance of a tax
experiment a measure that fully captures its effects. Legislators might hope that a
tax cut not only will lead to more work effort on the part of the recipients of the tax
cut, but also greater job creation by these individuals, who might be more likely to
start or expand businesses. Yet it will not always be straightforward to attribute job
gains and losses to particular taxpayers. The self-execution outcome might thus
depend on easily measured variables that may proxy for broader economic effects.
One form of self-executing tax experiment might allow for tax law to move
in opposite directions depending on the result, for example with a failed tax cut
experiment leading to an automatic tax increase. Suppose that legislators disagree
about the effects of increasing taxes on the wealthy, with more conservative
legislators worrying that this will lead the wealthy to work less hard and more
liberal legislators taking the opposite position. This is an empirical issue, and it is
an empirical issue to which an experiment is responsive. But many legislators seem
233
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unlikely to change their positions even if an experiment provides powerful
evidence, but self-execution might force a policy result. Such a self-executing
experiment might be easier to pass than an experiment that can only move the law
in one direction. If legislators on each side truly believe that the experiment will
vindicate their respective empirical positions, then both sides should be eager to
support such a self-executing experiment. Meanwhile, a refusal to agree to such a
self-executing experiment may expose legislators who claim that a tax law change
would lead to a particular result but do not in fact believe this to be true.
D. Larger Experimental Units
Non-revenue-neutral experiments, whether self-executing or not, will
produce information about how individual taxpayers respond to changes in tax law,
such as increases or decreases in tax rates. But often, the relevant question will be
how these changes affect others. We noted above that we might be interested in
whether businesses affected by a tax law change increase or decrease their hiring
levels. Moreover, even when interested in taxpayer responses, that information
might not be clear from the taxpayers’ tax returns. For example, an experiment
might impose a tax penalty on taxpayers who fail to purchase health insurance. The
Affordable Care Act included such an “individual mandate,”237 which the Supreme
Court upheld as a tax,238 but this individual mandate was removed in the most recent
tax reform.239 Tax returns might tell us whether a penalty leads more taxpayers to
purchase insurance, but it cannot provide information about how it affects these
taxpayers’ health.
A possible solution would be for tax experiments to occur at levels greater
than the individual taxpayer. We have already seen one example of this, the
possibility of a revenue-neutral tax experiment for the home mortgage interest
deduction, where home owners’ associations could decide to participate or not. Tax
experiments also might be executed at the level of a state, county, or locality. These
approaches might better indicate the effect of tax rates on hiring than an experiment
applying to individuals. It may be easy to obtain data on business activity or
economic growth in a region or for an industry, even when it might be difficult to
attribute that hiring to any particular individual. Similarly, unless the government
plans to start collecting health information on tax returns, it may be more capable
of evaluating health statistics already collected at various levels of government.240
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Such tax experiments reduce but do not eliminate the danger that a tax
experiment will simply shift economic activity.241 If a tax experiment results in
some individuals receiving a tax increase and others receiving a tax decrease, then
taxpayers may seek to take advantage of these discrepancies. For example, a
married couple filing separately242 might seek to ensure that income appears on the
tax form of the member of the couple who enjoys the lower tax rate.243 Such games
are more difficult to play when a tax is applied to an entire city, county or state.
There is, however, still a danger that economic activity may move across city or
state borders. At least on the margins, businesses will have incentives to move
activity from a location in a high-tax treatment group to a location in a low-tax
treatment group. Thus, tax experiments can produce distortions. Moreover, tax
experiment may give one business an advantage over a competitor, making tax
changes much more consequential than if they were applied uniformly. This is
problematic also because it may lead to misinterpretation. But if experimental units
are sufficiently large, such effects may be relatively small, and experiments of this
sort may provide the best available evidence of the effects of tax policy.
IV. CONCLUSION

This Article has considered a range of possible applications of tax
experimentation, from relatively small issues such as the entertainment deduction
to foundational questions about the effect of marginal tax rates on labor supply and
even the effect of tax policies on taxpayer health. Perhaps one reason that the
possibility of tax experiments has been neglected is that it seems politically
implausible that the government would randomly assign taxpayers to different tax
rates, let alone assign different municipalities to different tax rules. This Article’s
ambition has been to show that more modest tax experimentation, featuring
revenue-neutral designs and voluntary participation, might sometimes be possible,
and that interpretive challenges can be addressed. Initial forays involving discrete
code provisions could lead to voluntary experiments in which taxpayers receive
some tax rate reward in exchange for their willingness to being assigned to any of
many tax treatments. Such a program could increase the odds that the next great tax
reform is based on a solid foundation of evidence.
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